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Introduction 
 
Previous research establishes that the majority of all net financing are through the use of cash 
reserves. Furthermore, recent research finds that US firms doubled their cash balances in the past 
three decades (Bates et al. (2009)). As cash reserves account for an increasingly greater portion 
of corporate assets, academic research on corporate cash holdings has gained momentum in 
recent years. One line of the literature on cash holdings explores the various determinants of cash 
holdings while the second strand of the research focuses on the real implications of cash 
holdings. These studies have broadened and enhanced our understanding of the various facets of 
corporate cash policy. Nevertheless, much of the research focuses on the US firms and the 
evidence is mixed. It is fair to say that many questions remain unanswered in this area. For 
example, we lack conclusive evidence on the most fundamental question of whether investors 
should worry about large cash reserves. Furthermore, serving as a similarly important role as 
debts in corporate financing, corporate cash holdings have not actually received enough attention 
compared to capital structures. If we acknowledge that the choice of capital structures is still 
puzzling to us, we must admit that we have far more unknowns about corporate liquidity policy.  
I started my research on corporate cash holdings by investigating whether the time trend on 
cash holdings observed in the US extends to other industrialized countries in the first chapter of 
this dissertation. Extending this study into international setting serves three purposes: one is to 
conduct an out-of-sample test of US findings, the second is to explore the ramifications of 
institutional structures for corporate liquidity policy and the last one is to test the agency motive 
of corporate cash holdings.  
Focusing on the US, Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Canada and the UK, I find an almost 
systematic upward trend in cash holdings across seven industrialized countries over 1991-2008 
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with the exception of Japan which exhibit a substantial decline; however, the driving forces 
underlying the cash pattern are not uniform across countries. The agency motive plays a role in 
the rise in cash balances in Germany. My analysis highlights that the functioning of the financial 
system is crucial to corporate cash policy as Australia’s cash pattern is driven by shallow private 
credit markets that curbed cash reserves during the earlier period of my study and the 
decelerating cash trend in Japan is ascribed to financial reforms that eliminated rent-extraction 
opportunities by banks.  
The second chapter on cash holdings in this dissertation is concerned with the real 
implications of holding excess cash, that is the depletion of cash assets and resulting effect on 
firms’ operating performance. Firms may hold cash out of economic reasons, such as transaction 
and precautionary consideration, or agency costs motive. Whether large cash holdings bode well 
for shareholders is an important empirical issue. However, the extant evidence is mixed in the 
US. Researchers attribute the mixed evidence to the strong investor protection in the US. In this 
chapter, I explore this issue in the multi-countries setting to take advantage of the large variation 
in legal environment across countries. My measure of the strength of legal environment is based 
on both de jure and de facto aspects of regulation. The de jure measure of investor protection is 
the anti-director rights (shareholder rights) index defined in LLSV (1998) and extended by 
Spamann (2009). The de facto investor protection is proxied by the rule of law and expropriation 
risk index drawn from LLSV (1998), which assesses the rule and order tradition of a country and 
governance stance towards business, respectively. 
Using time-series financial data from 41 countries, I provide new evidence that firms under 
weaker legal structures or external corporate governance do not hold more cash as previously 
thought. Instead, my results reveal that the agency conflicts of corporate cash holdings primarily 
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manifest themselves through the use of cash. Simply put, firms invest more in the presence of 
excess cash and this effect is exacerbated in countries with weaker corporate governance. The 
inefficient use of excess cash hinders firms’ performance, especially in countries where investors 
are not well protected. These findings are significant because they imply that the agency conflict 
of cash holdings primarily lies in the misallocation of capital, not in its accumulation.   
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Chapter 1: Why Do Firms Hold So Much Cash? 
The International Evidence 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Corporate cash holdings account for a significant part of corporate assets in US balance 
sheets and are indispensable for corporate operations. Large cash holdings held by corporations 
have recently received increasing attention from both the financial press and academia. As of 
September 2009, the cash to assets ratio of the largest 500 non-financial US corporations has 
risen to 9.8%.
1
 For instance, Google Inc. is flush with a cache of $22 billion in liquid assets 
accounting for an astounding 58% of its assets while the information technology sector as a 
whole is reported to hold 27% of assets in cash reserves.
2
 In their recent work, Bates, Kahle and 
Stulz (2009) find that US firms more than doubled their cash holdings in the past three decades 
with average cash reserves progressively growing from 10% of assets in 1980 to 23% in 2006. 
They attribute this astonishing rise in cash to enhanced precautionary demand for cash spurred 
by changing firm attributes and not due to agency conflicts. Their findings suggest that elevated 
US cash holdings do not translate into ―excess‖ cash. 
 The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether this large footprint of cash holdings 
observed in US corporate balance sheets is systemically shared by other industrialized countries. 
An intriguing, but unexplored question is whether the cash pattern observed in the US is an 
isolated or universal phenomenon. Simply put, is there a glut of cash holdings across the board 
globally?  In essence, my study evaluates Bates et al.’s conclusions in a broader context, in an 
attempt to discover the extent to which their ﬁndings carry over to a broader sample of ﬁrms in 
other industrialized countries. If this phenomenon of pullulate cash reserves is ubiquitous, what 
                                                 
 1 Federal Reserve Bank data for 2009 indicates that corporate cash holdings are roughly 15% of US GDP.   
 2 See The Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2009 (Companies Are Stockpiling Cash) and The Economist, July 7, 
2006 (The Corporate Savings Glut). 
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prompted these changes?  And are these levels of cash justifiable? If firms unjustifiably increase 
cash balances, the wealth loss to shareholders due to mismanagement of cash can be substantial 
when cash represents an increasingly higher portion of corporate assets. I extend the literature to 
the international setting by examining evidence on secular trends in corporate cash holdings for 
seven major industrialized countries (the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, Japan and Australia) over the period 1991-2008. As such, this study is primarily 
exploratory in nature rendering this paper’s approach akin in spirit to a number of studies that 
focus on cross-country comparisons for various corporate issues such as financing patterns 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001) and 
dividend payout changes (Denis and Osobov, 2008), to name a few. 
Even though my sample countries are homogeneous in economic development, they vary in 
institutional structures (such as shareholder rights, capital system orientation and the 
development of financial markets). The extent to which other industrialized countries do not 
exhibit similar cash pattern to US can speak to the relevance of institutional structures in equally 
developed countries. To the extent that sample countries experience similar time trends to the 
US, but with different underlying motivations, they enhance our understanding of the 
determinants of cash practices. Finally, if sample countries share similar secular trends and 
driving forces behind it, my results serve as an out-of-sample test of US findings.   
In addition, the use of international data allows us to provide tests of the role of agency 
motives in corporate cash balances. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow argument posits that 
managerial opportunism can lead to stockpiling of cash at the expense of shareholders’ welfare. 
Elevated cash levels facilitate managerial overinvestment inclinations and consumption of 
perquisites, in addition to insulating managers from external monitoring by capital markets. To 
6 
 
   
date, there is little, if any, evidence that corporate cash hoardings in the US are motivated by 
managerial opportunism.
3
 Previous literature attributes this finding to the high quality of investor 
protection which forces entrenched managers in US firms to disgorge cash holdings. This begs 
the question of whether other countries with similarly strong shareholder rights as the US also 
show little evidence of agency conflicts in liquidity policy decisions. Prior research on 
international cash holdings (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson, 2006; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007) addresses the question of whether countries with 
poor investor protections in aggregate suffer from agency problems in liquidity decisions. In 
contrast, I take on a different route by investigating whether the managerial agency motive is 
behind any secular trends in cash holdings in a specific country.  
For a sample of 167,601 firm-year observations covering seven countries, my study 
contributes to the literature by documenting a long-term dramatic upward trend in corporate cash 
balances (ranging from 54% to 161%) in Canada, Australia, Germany, UK and US over a sample 
period spanning 18 years from 1991 to 2008. France posts the smallest increase (21%) in cash 
holdings while Japan experiences a pronounced decline of 21% in cash balances. The situation in 
Japan differs from other countries because its powerful banking sector extracted rents by forcing 
Japanese corporations to hold large cash balances during the 1980s. My results demonstrate that 
Japanese corporations’ cash balances reached a more economically based level in the 2000s. The 
broader implication of the findings for Japan underscores the relevance of the functioning of the 
financial system to changes in corporate liquidity policy. Additional findings show that the 
suboptimal cash levels at Japanese firms induced by rent-extraction had a greater impact on low 
growth firms.  
                                                 
 3 See, for instance, Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008; Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; and Bates et al., 2009. 
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My empirical analysis reveals that while sample countries share some common determinants 
of cash holdings, they also exhibit heterogeneity in the magnitude and relevance of certain 
determinants of corporate cash reserves identified for US firms. The findings accentuate the fact 
that the underlying forces found to influence firms’ cash policy in the US are not spurious. 
Specifically, I find that market-to-book ratio, leverage, net working capital and capital 
expenditures have similar sway on cash balances across countries, supporting the view that cash 
holdings are built up by firms with growth opportunities and fewer substitutes for liquid asset.  
I reason that if the institutional environment influence how firms set their cash policy, then 
the influence of the firm’s dividend status on cash policy setting will vary based on the capital 
market orientation. My findings indicate that dividend paying firms which have greater access to 
external financing, and hence face little financial constraints, hold lower cash balances in 
Australia, Canada, UK and the US, but maintain higher reserves in the remaining three countries, 
suggesting that the well-documented effect of financial constraints on cash holdings in the US is 
only shared by other capital market-centered systems, but not in countries with bank-centered 
orientation where close ties with relationship banks reduce informational asymmetry between 
lender and borrower, causing financially constrained firms to hold less precautionary cash. 
Moreover, sample countries differ in their policies of how much cash to keep when it comes to 
cash flow risk and R&D innovations, with Japanese firms being the most conservative as they 
accumulate more cash in response to business risk and R&D innovation.   
Firm attributes change markedly over the sample period for all seven countries. Examination 
of the evolution of firm characteristics reveals that the increase in cash holdings in all countries 
is accompanied by pronounced leverage declines (26%) indicative that firms in sample countries 
do not simply finance the increase in liquid assets with additional debt; rather, they have 
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deployed some of liquid assets to reduce leverage. I also observe a decline in net leverage (debt 
minus cash) that is more than twice the rate of decline in leverage, which suggests that firms 
favor holding on to some of their accumulated cash balances rather than eliminate completely 
their outstanding debt. In addition, all countries exhibit a decline in net working capital over time 
driven by more efficient inventory management. The steady increase in market-to-book ratio and 
substantial spike in cash flow volatility over the sample period for most countries is accompanied 
by a decline in firm size and corroborates the recent literature on increases in idiosyncratic risk 
across countries. During the last two decades a shift has occurred in corporate investments away 
from expenditures on capital stock and working capital and into R&D investments that appears 
to have necessitated reduced leverage and accumulations of cash. In a nutshell, my findings 
reveal a pronounced convergent evolution of firm attributes in these industrialized countries.  
Further, I find that sample countries exhibit some commonality in the impact of changing 
firm attributes on the changes in cash reserves where the most important four factors affecting all 
sample countries are: changes in net working capital, changes in R&D expenses, changes in 
growth options and changes in industry cash flow volatility. These common factors point to the 
fact that firms that engage in building up their liquid assets are riskier firms with more 
information asymmetry. 
Using different strategies to investigate whether the evolutionary changes in firm attributes 
provokes the shift in cash holdings, I document compelling evidence that the secular cash pattern 
is explainable by the time-varying firm attributes for only some countries—revealing that US, 
Canadian and French firms exhibit a declining—not increasing—time trend in cash reserves after 
accounting for changing firm attributes. This implies that the documented build up in cash 
holdings does not necessarily constitute excess cash in these countries. Japanese firms, induced 
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by financial reforms, exhibit even deeper cuts in their cash balances after controlling for 
changing firm characteristics. However, for Australia and Germany, even though the time-
varying characteristics explain part of the upward trend in liquid assets, there is some evidence 
that other unobserved factors play a role in the upsurge in cash reserves.  
To understand the rationale behind the cash pattern in Germany and Australia, I scrutinize 
whether the agency motive is a trigger behind the secular trend. First, I examine the association 
between growth opportunities and excess cash over time. I reason that excess cash in firms with 
superior investment prospects are more likely to be put to good uses than in firms with poor 
opportunities. Thus, if managerial opportunism drives cash policy—firms accumulate cash 
instead of paying it out to shareholders—it is more likely to be agency driven when it occurs in 
firms with inferior investment opportunities. Out of the seven sample countries, only German 
firms with poor growth opportunities hold positive excess cash over time, suggesting an agency 
motive in the secular cash pattern.  
In a second test, I examine whether an additional dollar of cash in firms that increase their 
cash reserves contributes less to a change in firm value compared to firms that experience 
declines in cash balances on the grounds that cash reserves beyond justifiable levels facilitate 
extraction of private benefits. The evidence confirms the agency motive behind the accumulation 
of cash in Germany. I do not find similar evidence in other countries.  
For Australia, I conduct a battery of tests on whether external financing costs, macro-
economic changes or other factors which are not characterized in the current prevailing model of 
the determinants of cash holdings are capable of explaining the increase in cash holdings. My 
results show that developments in capital markets add explanatory power to the changes in cash 
balances, particularly the expansion of credit markets. The evidence suggests that the upward 
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cash pattern in Australia is driven by shallow private credit markets during the earlier period of 
my study which rendered corporate cash holdings inadequate early on. These findings establish 
that the functioning and development of the financial system are central to our understanding of 
corporate cash policy. In sum, although the phenomenon of upward cash trend documented for 
the US is shared by Australia and Germany, the causes that provoked the higher demand are not 
uniform across countries. Further, the causes behind the cash patterns in Australia and Japan 
highlight the importance of the functioning of financial markets to corporate cash practices.  
Cross-country studies using international data to conduct time-series analysis can be subject 
to sample coverage bias. To explore this issue, I conduct a series of robustness checks and find 
that sample coverage bias in Worldscope does not influence the secular cash trend in my sample 
countries. In addition, I show that firms entering the sample in later years constitute a major 
driving force of the upward cash trend, especially in France and UK. The new entrant effect is 
consistent with the previous findings on cash holdings in the US (Bates et al., 2009) and dividend 
policy (Denis and Osobov, 2008).
4
  
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I discuss theoretical predictions and empirical 
evidence in the literature in section 1.2. The sample construction and data description are 
detailed in section 1.3. The empirical results on the secular cash trends are provided in section 
1.4. I describe the results from my analysis of the economic determinants of corporate cash 
holdings in section 1.5. I devote section 1.6 to the analysis of whether changing firm attributes 
explain the secular change in cash ratio and the determinants of this secular trend of cash 
                                                 
 4 I recognize that different accounting practices can present difficulty in interpretation of the results which is an 
inherent limitation in cross-country studies; for example, the valuation of assets in Germany may differ substantially 
from other countries because German accounting places greater emphasis on ―conservatism.‖  
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reserves. In section 1.7, I explore the relevance of the agency motive and institutional structures 
behind unexplained changes in cash policies. Section 1.8 concludes this chapter. 
1.2. Literature background and theoretical predictions  
1.2.1. Literature background 
The financial economics literature offers a number of rationales for holding liquid assets, the 
earliest of which is the need to conserve on the cost of converting nonfinancial assets into cash, 
commonly referred to as the transaction cost motive. According to this rationale, firms that are 
more likely to incur higher transaction costs are expected to maintain higher cash balances. Cash 
and marketable securities also are employed for precautionary reasons to meet the needs of the 
firm when it faces unanticipated contingencies. However, accumulating high levels of cash 
reserves can exact a price, the most notable of which is the low rate of return on cash relative to 
investments in real assets. The conventional trade-off view holds that the firm will optimize cash 
holdings by balancing the marginal costs of investing in low return liquid assets against the 
marginal costs of being short of funds.  
More recent research advances more nuanced reasons to hold cash by positing that being 
short on cash can be costly if it forces the firm to forego valuable investment opportunities due to 
costly external financing. Under this argument, firms with greater information asymmetry, higher 
agency costs of debt, and more difficult access to external funds are more likely to seek 
investment flexibility by building cash reserves, thus escaping the underinvestment problem. 
Baskin (1987) puts forward the notion that cash holdings allow the firm to swiftly deploy funds 
for strategic purposes to pre-empt the competition while John (1993) argues that firms subject to 
higher financial distress costs will hold larger cash balances to reduce the likelihood of financial 
trouble.  
12 
 
   
A number of researchers show that firms amass cash reserves to safeguard against future 
liquidity shocks—in other words, cash serves as liquidity insurance in imperfect capital markets. 
For example, both Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) document that cash holdings are 
positively related to the costs of external financing and cash flow volatility. Lins et al. (2010) 
provide survey evidence that firms around the world use cash reserves as a hedge against future 
cash flow volatility. Further, Acharya et al. (2007) and Almeida et al. (2004) point out that only 
financially constrained firms exhibit inclinations to invest cash out of cash flow to hedge against 
changes in the expected value of future cash flow.  
Large cash holdings can exact a price in the form of the managerial discretion problem. As 
the most liquid asset, cash can be easily converted into private benefits. Accordingly, entrenched 
managers may stockpile cash to facilitate their overinvestment inclinations and consumption of 
perquisites, as well as to avoid external monitoring from capital markets. Because cash is at the 
most risk to be misused or consumed, liquid assets provide a unique opportunity to investigate 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. However, the empirical evidence, thus far, 
on the agency motive of cash holdings is mixed. While Dittmar et al.’s (2003) study shows that 
firms in countries with poor shareholder rights hold more cash, Opler et al. (1999), Harford et al. 
(2008), and Bates et al. (2009) do not find evidence that the agency motive drives corporate cash 
policy in the US. These latter studies attribute their results to strong external investor protection 
in the US that forces self-interested management to disgorge free cash flows. In addition to 
country level shareholder rights, the banking system also plays a role in corporate liquidity 
policy. On the one hand, the close ties with the relationship bank reduce informational 
asymmetry, which permits firms to hold less cash for precautionary purposes; yet the rent-
extraction by banks may force firms to amass higher levels of cash reserves. 
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1.2.2. Theoretical predictions  
 
Guided by the literature discussed above, several firm-specific characteristics are identified 
as relevant in determining firms’ cash policies. Among these are future investment opportunities, 
information asymmetry, firm size, cash flows, volatility of cash flows, substitutes for cash, and 
the ability to access the external markets which are employed in my model explaining cash 
holdings.  
Firms with higher growth options have informational disadvantages which make external 
financing costly. In addition, financial distress costs are high for firms with higher growth 
options given that growth opportunities are intangible in nature and their value falls sharply in 
financial distress. Thus, corporate liquid assets can be viewed as an insurance policy that reduces 
the likelihood of financial distress and the odds of foregoing good investments when external 
financing is expensive.  
Schroth and Szalay (2009) argue that firms racing to innovate may hold cash not only to 
invest in a timely manner but also to do it faster than their competitors. For firms who want to be 
in the technological lead, their innovation success is dependent on cash holdings. Given that 
firms with high R&D outlays tend to be more opaque, R&D expenses also serve as a proxy for 
information asymmetry as well as for costs of financial distress. These arguments suggest a 
positive link between R&D intensity and cash balances.  
Firms facing liquidity constraints can raise cash balances by selling nonfinancial assets or 
reducing dividends. Working capital serves as a good substitute for holding a high level of cash 
because of ease of conversion into cash. Therefore, firms holding more working capital will hold 
lower cash balances. Besides serving as substitutes for cash holdings, dividends are proxy for 
financial soundness. Almeida et al. (2004) consider non-dividend payers as financially 
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constrained. Moreover, dividend payers have a track record in capital markets and enjoy lower 
external financing costs. This argument suggests that dividend payment status should have a 
negative effect on corporate liquid assets. However, close ties with relationship banks can reduce 
the informational asymmetry faced by financially constrained firms and thus render non-
dividend payers less motivated to hold precautionary cash. Therefore, I posit that the capital 
market orientation might alter the relevance of dividends to cash policy.   
Industry cash flow volatility is associated with higher frequency of cash flow shortfalls, 
which can adversely affect the firm’s future investments. To avoid passing up valuable 
investment opportunities, firms in industries with more volatile cash flows are expected to hold 
more cash. In other words, the association between industry cash flow risk and cash holdings 
should be positive.   
It is often argued that small firms have greater information asymmetry, greater sensitivity to 
economic shocks, and higher costs of financial distress than large firms. Furthermore, larger 
firms have better access to capital markets while at the same time enjoy economies of scale for 
cash management. Accordingly, small firms are expected to hold higher levels of cash balances 
than large firms.  
The pecking-order model of financing choice suggests that there is no optimal cash holding 
in corporations and firms’ cash balances are the mechanical outcome of investment and 
financing decisions (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Hence, firms with large cash flows are expected 
to maintain higher cash balances—a prediction of a positive sign on firm cash flows. However, 
Kim et al. (1998) maintain that the higher the cash flow, the greater the ability of the firm to 
generate cash and less likely to be subject to financial constraints. Hence, they postulate a lower 
15 
 
   
precautionary demand for cash for such firms. Therefore, the link between cash flow and 
corporate cash holdings is ambiguous.  
Borrowing capability of the firm also serves as a substitute for cash holdings. Acharya et al. 
(2007) argue that firms can increase future funding capacity by either issuing additional debt to 
boost its cash balances or paying down outstanding debts to preserve its borrowing capacity. 
Accordingly, cash holdings may be positively linked to leverage. However, more highly levered 
firms may face higher costs of external financing due to asset substitution and the 
underinvestment problem. In addition, Baskin (1987) argues that the cost of investing in liquid 
assets increases with debt financing. These arguments suggest a negative relation between 
leverage and cash holdings. Overall, the association between leverage and cash holdings is an 
empirical issue. 
It has been argued that capital expenditures, by creating assets that can be employed as 
collateral, can potentially increase a firm’s borrowing capacity, which would reduce the firm’s 
needs for cash reserves. Further, as demonstrated by Riddick and Whited (2009), productivity 
shocks that lead to jumps in investments can lead to lower cash balances. Thus the predicted link 
for capital expenditure is negative. 
1.3. Sample and data 
1.3.1. Sample construction 
I begin by gathering financial data from Worldcope database for all firms between 1981 and 
2008. I exclude firms that have missing information on the method of reporting long-term 
investments in which they have interest in excess of 50% and firms that do not consolidate their 
major subsidiaries. I also require observations to have non-missing and non-negative values on 
total assets, sales, book value of equity, and cash and marketable securities. I also exclude 
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financial services and utilities firms, whose cash policies are influenced by statutory capital 
requirements and other government regulations.  
After imposing data availability requirements, only several countries have enough 
observations that enable us to conduct time-series analyses of corporate cash holdings. I focus 
my analysis on seven industrialized countries—the US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, Japan, 
and Australia—over 1991-2008 period. I include the US in my analysis for comparative 
purposes. I choose 1991 as the start year because firm coverage in Worldscope is sparse before 
1985. Further, Denis and Osobov (2008) find that virtually all firms covered by Worldscope in 
the 1981–1985 period are larger and more mature firms and that over time smaller firms were 
added to Worldscope database. By starting my sample period in 1991, I try to avoid this bias. 
The final sample consists of 167,601 observations for 20,688 firms from the seven sample 
countries. The subsequent various analyses may have different observations due to missing 
values of certain variables. 
1.3.2. General data description 
 
Table 1.1 displays descriptive statistics for key firm characteristics for time-series cross-
sectional data from 1991-2008 for my sample countries. I calculate corporate cash holdings as 
the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets.
5
 Some previous research employs cash 
and marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets less cash and marketable 
securities. I find extreme outliers in my data when I use a cash ratio scaled by net assets. To 
alleviate the effect of outliers, I winsorize all financial data at the 1% in both tails of each 
variable.  The  statistics  are  measured as the  average of  annual median values. Market-to-book 
                                                 
 5 This measure may not fully capture a firm’s liquidity position. In their survey of CFOs of public and private 
firms around the world, Lins, et al. (2010) report that corporate cash balances represent a part of total corporate 
liquidity while lines of credit constitute optional liquidity that can meet their future external financing needs. Since 
data for lines of credit for our sample countries is unavailable, our analysis is based on cash holdings.   
17 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 Firm Characteristics for Seven Countries 
 
This table provides summary statistics for a sample of seven industrialized countries over the period 1991 
to 2008. Sample includes all firm-year observations in Worldscope database (excluding financials and 
utilities) with non-missing and non-negative values on total assets, sales, cash and marketable securities, and 
book value of equity.  All numbers are averages of annual median values. Size is the book value of assets in 
2008 US dollars (millions). Percent of firms with R&D (dividend payers) is the mean value of the annual 
proportion of firms with positive R&D expense ratio (dividends).  
            
  Cash  Market-  Cash    % Firms % Div 
Country # of Obs. Ratio Size to-Book Leverage Flow CAPEX CFVOL NWC w/R&D Payers 
Australia  8,281 0.072 140 1.382 0.167 0.049 0.046 0.078 0.007 0.210 0.496 
Canada  9,057 0.045 160 1.314 0.205 0.060 0.058 0.056 0.021 0.246 0.344 
France  9,370 0.096 169 1.224 0.211 0.071 0.041 0.032 0.045 0.199 0.635 
Germany  8,663 0.074 219 1.247 0.184 0.069 0.053 0.042 0.106 0.314 0.526 
Japan 34,950 0.139 436 1.113 0.256 0.035 0.034 0.016 -0.013 0.522 0.854 
UK 19,994 0.086 111 1.467 0.157 0.057 0.042 0.049 0.001 0.329 0.667 
US 77,286 0.101 162 1.530 0.162 0.064 0.041 0.061 0.070 0.468 0.251 
 
is estimated as (total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity) scaled by total 
assets. Book leverage is measured as long term debt plus short term debt, net leverage is long 
term and short term debt minus cash and marketable securities, cash flow is earnings after 
interest, taxes and common dividends but before depreciation, and net working capital is current 
assets less current liabilities less cash and marketable securities. All above variables are scaled 
by total assets. 
Table 1.1 shows that although cash holdings vary widely from a 13.9% high for Japan to a 
4.5% low for Canada, the remaining countries’ cash balances lie within a tight range—from 
7.2% to 10.1% of assets. Column 4 of the table reveals that firm size is fairly homogeneous 
across countries from mean size of $111 million in UK to $169 million in France with the 
exception of Japan and Germany where the average firm size is $436 million and $219 million, 
respectively. Consistent with previous studies, my data indicates that the US and UK have the 
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highest market-to-book ratios, while Japan has the lowest growth options over my sample period. 
Leverage, net leverage, cash flow, and capital expenditures do not exhibit substantial variability 
across countries in my sample. However, firms hold substantially different levels of net working 
capital across countries. For instance, firms in Germany hold the highest level of net working 
capital—12.1% of their total assets—while Japanese firms on the other side of the spectrum hold 
-1.5% of their total assets in net working capital. 
 Interestingly, Australia ranks highest in cash flow volatility, CFVOL, while Japan has the 
lowest variability. To ameliorate the impact of outliers, I measure CFVOL as the median 
standard deviation of industry cash flows over the previous eight years (minimum of 3 years 
needed) using the procedure employed by prior research.
6
 The high average cash flow volatility 
in Australia is attributable to the remarkably sharp increase in cash flow risk from 3.9% in 1997-
2002 period to 15.9% in 2003-2008 period, a period marked by high commodity price volatility. 
The last two columns in the table indicate that firms in sample countries exhibit varied 
characteristics in terms of R&D expenses and dividend policy. A greater proportion of Japanese 
and US firms invest in R&D than in other countries. Further, Japanese firms are more likely to 
pay dividends while the US has the smallest fraction of dividend payers.  
1.3.3. Description of evolution in firm attributes 
 
The general summary of the data in Table 1.1 may mask time-series properties of firm 
attributes across countries. Since the main objective of my paper is to examine the dynamics of 
corporate cash holdings, I am interested in the time-series evolution of the determinants of liquid 
assets. Consequently, I split the sample period into three subperiods—1991-1996, 1997- 
                                                 
 6 I rely on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) for industry classification which is offered by Dow Jones 
Indexes and FTSE and adopted by stock exchanges representing over 65% of the world’s market capitalization. ICB 
has a four-tiered structure: 10 industries, 19 supersectors, 41 sectors and 114 subsectors.     
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Table 1.2 Evolution of Firm Characteristics 
 
     This table provides the evolution of firm characteristics in seven industrialized countries over 1991-2008 period. 
Sample includes all firm-year observations in Worldscope database (excluding financials and utilities) with non-missing 
and non-negative values on total assets, sales, cash and marketable securities, and book value of equity. The sample 
period is divided into three subperiods: 1991-1996, 1997-2002 and 2003-2008. All numbers are averages of annual 
median values for each subperiod. Percent of firms with R&D (dividend payers) for each subperiod is the mean value of 
the annual proportion of firms with positive R&D expense ratio (dividends).  
                        
  Firm 
Size 
Market
-to- 
 Net Cash    %Firms %Div. 
Country Period ($Mil) Book Leverage Leverag Flow CAPEX CFVOL NWC w/R&D Payers 
Australia 1991-1996 279 1.310 0.190 0.129 0.065 0.056 0.035 0.025 0.278 0.774 
 1997-2002 110 1.313 0.186 0.121 0.044 0.045 0.039 0.004 0.200 0.517 
 2003-2008 32 1.523 0.124 0.016 0.038 0.035 0.159     -
0.007 
0.202 0.426 
            
Canada 1991-1996 270 1.242 0.242 0.203 0.068 0.061 0.038 0.037 0.206 0.512 
 1997-2002 112 1.288 0.212 0.145 0.062 0.062 0.049 0.024 0.265 0.290 
 2003-2008 98 1.413 0.160 0.087 0.048 0.052 0.081 0.001 0.246 0.323 
            
France 1991-1996 274 1.099 0.232 0.137 0.070 0.045 0.024 0.061 0.148 0.753 
 1997-2002 87 1.292 0.207 0.111 0.078 0.045 0.032 0.050 0.150 0.601 
 2003-2008 145 1.282 0.193 0.086 0.065 0.032 0.040 0.024 0.295 0.579 
            
Germany 1991-1996 399 1.244 0.200 0.134 0.072 0.071 0.025 0.166 0.205 0.721 
 1997-2002 126 1.245 0.184 0.099 0.068 0.054 0.038 0.097 0.267 0.518 
 2003-2008 132 1.253 0.169 0.060 0.067 0.034 0.062 0.054 0.419 0.431 
            
Japan 1991-1996 653 1.308 0.305 0.136 0.023 0.045 0.010     -
0.033 
0.419 0.892 
 1997-2002 360 0.997 0.266 0.127 0.035 0.032 0.016     -
0.022 
0.416 0.837 
 2003-2008 297 1.034 0.198 0.070 0.047 0.025 0.022 0.017 0.656 0.851 
            
UK 1991-1996 128 1.439 0.175 0.093 0.064 0.051 0.030 0.033 0.320 0.845 
 1997-2002 101 1.496 0.156 0.074 0.055 0.046 0.046     -
0.017 
0.320 0.665 
 2003-2008 105 1.467 0.141 0.051 0.053 0.029 0.071     -
0.013 
0.345 0.530 
            
US 1991-1996 195 1.524 0.186 0.100 0.081 0.051 0.033 0.124 0.453 0.367 
 1997-2002 119 1.427 0.162 0.055 0.055 0.041 0.056 0.054 0.464 0.191 
  2003-2008 174 1.640 0.139 0.003 0.057 0.030 0.093 0.033 0.484 0.244 
 
2002, and 2003-2008—and calculate the average of annual median values for firm attributes for 
each subperiod and present the results in Table 1.2. 
Market-to-book ratio increases steadily over time in Australia, Canada, France and the US, 
declines in Japan, and remains almost unchanged in Germany and UK. Column 5 and Fig. 1.1 
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            Fig. 1.1. Evolution of leverage for seven industrialized countries from 1991 to 2008 
depicting  the  average  leverage  over  time  indicate that although leverage levels are somewhat 
similar across these countries, corroborating Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) findings, the median 
country’s leverage exhibits large declines across all countries with 26.4% drop from earlier 
period (1991-1996) to latest period (2003-2008). Japan and Australia experience the biggest 
declines of roughly 35% and 34%, respectively. In addition, leverage measured after cash and 
marketable securities, net leverage, paints a more dramatic picture. Column 6 and Fig. 1.2 both 
highlight the fact that net leverage ratio has decreased by impressively large amounts across all 
seven countries with the median country reducing net leverage over 60%. Australia had a 
precipitous decline in net leverage of over 87% from the earliest to the latest subperiod. Further, 
Fig. 1.2 shows that the US and Australia have zero or negative net leverage in more recent years, 
reflecting that nonfinanical firms in these two countries were net lenders, not borrowers. The 
downward patterns in leverage and net leverage imply a significant deleveraging trend as 
corporations in all these industrialized countries have cut back on their reliance on debt as a 
source of financing over the last two decades.  
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         Fig. 1.2. Evolution of net leverage for seven industrialized countries from 1991 to 2008 
Furthermore, net working capital declines dramatically in countries other than Japan with the 
decline ranging from 135% in Australia to 61% in France. A closer inspection of the data reveals 
that this decline is driven largely by diminishing investments in inventories and to some degree 
in accounts receivables. Cash flow to assets exhibits a downward trend in all countries except in 
Japan. I also find that all sample countries experience a substantial decrease in their capital 
spending over the sample period, indicative of weakening corporate investments and a general 
decline in capital intensity in developed countries. Canada experiences the smallest decline of 
roughly 15% and Germany the largest with a staggering 52% drop. In contrast, cash flow 
volatility figures depict remarkably massive increases over the three subperiods across all 
countries with the smallest increase being 67% in France, suggesting increasingly uncertain 
environments. A closer look at the year-by-year numbers reveals that cash flow volatility peaks 
around 2004 and 2005 in most countries and declines afterwards, consistent with the findings in 
a growing body of research on idiosyncratic risk (Campbell, et al., 2001; Brandt et al. 2008).  
The second to last column reveals large increases over the three periods in the proportion of 
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firms with R&D expenditures in almost all sample countries with the exception of Australia 
which displays a decline in the fraction of firms with R&D outlays. Consistent with Fama and 
French (2001) and Denis and Osobov (2008), I observe a steady decline in the proportion of 
firms with dividend payouts. Both of these trends, concurrent with other changes in firm 
characteristics—steady increases in riskiness of cash flows and market-to-book ratio, a greater 
proportion of smaller firms—point to a striking convergence in evolution in key attributes of 
sample firms that fuels firms’ need for more cash for precautionary motives.   
1.4. International evidence on secular changes in cash holdings 
 
In this section, I shed light on the secular changes in cash holdings for the seven sample 
countries over time. Fig. 1.3 depicts the dynamics of cash holdings using the mean annual cash 
ratios for each country. All countries exhibit a substantial secular increase in cash balances with 
two exceptions. France posts a more modest increase, 21.3%, in cash holdings and Japan 
experiences a decline of 20.5% in cash balances. The decline in Japanese firms’ cash reserves to 
15.8% in 2008 brings it more in line with other countries in my sample. Australia’s average cash 
ratio more than doubles during sample period while the growth in cash balances in Canada, US, 
UK and Germany cluster in a narrow range from 54.1% to 88.2%.  
A closer examination reveals that firms in all sample countries except for Japan experience a 
substantial decline of cash holdings in 2008 ranging from 3.7% in Germany to 12.3% in Canada, 
consistent with the survey evidence by Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) that firms around 
the world drew down their cash reserves to finance investments and operations during the recent 
financial crisis when capital markets seized up and external financing was prohibitively costly. In 
addition, I find that corporate cash holdings peak around 2004-2005, and then fall slightly in 
recent years in all sample countries except Australia. Bates et al. (2009) who document similar 
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evidence for US firms point that the slight decline in cash ratios coincides with the recent reverse 
in increases in idiosyncratic risk.           
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Fig. 1.3. Evolution of average cash ratio for seven industrialized countries from 1991 to 2008 
To quantify and test the significance of the secular change in cash holdings, I estimate 
regressions of the mean cash ratio each year on a time-trend variable, YEAR. The untabulated 
empirical results show that all the coefficients for the time-trend variable (except for Japan) are 
positive and highly statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting a robust upward trend in 
corporate cash reserves in all sample countries except in Japan. The estimates reveal that the 
average cash holdings in the US have increased by 0.58% annually over the 18-year period, 
which is similar to the corresponding figure documented by Bates et al. (2009) for US firms 
during 1980-2006 period. Australia has the highest increase in cash holdings among sample 
countries, with coefficient on YEAR of 0.92%. Canada, Germany and UK have a similar secular 
trend in corporate cash balances, with increases in cash holdings of 0.48%, 0.65% and 0.38%, 
respectively. France posts a small but significant 0.19% increase, while Japan is unique among 
these sample countries, posting a substantial decrease in cash ratio at 0.21% annually.  
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The increase in cash holdings, in combination with the results in the preceding section, points 
to a number of revealing conclusions. First, the accumulation of cash is not an outgrowth of 
increases in cash flows since the latter declines on aggregate. More likely, the observed surge in 
cash reserves is a reflection of reductions in spending on capital stock. Second, the concurrent 
significant secular increases in cash holdings and downward trend in leverage lead us to 
conclude that firms in my sample countries do not simply finance their liquid assets with 
additional debt; rather, they have employed some of those built up liquid assets to reduce 
leverage. Third, given that shrinkage in net leverage is more than twice the rate of decline in 
leverage, it appears that firms favor holding on to some of their accumulated cash balances rather 
than eliminate completely their outstanding debt. Furthermore, the evidence in Japan suggests 
that the substantial decrease in cash holdings was achieved by paying down debt, consistent with 
the argument that Japanese banks wielding significant influence expropriated wealth from 
industrial firms by forcing them to borrow more, thus inflating corporate cash holdings. As new 
regulation governing issues of debt and equity removed the hold of banks on Japanese 
corporations, firms began to pay down their debt, thereby decreasing their cash holdings. In a 
nutshell, during the last two decades a shift has occurred in corporate investments away from 
expenditures on capital stock and into R&D investments, which appears to have necessitated 
reduced leverage and accumulations of cash. 
For robustness, I also use the median cash ratios to estimate the secular trends. My results are 
invariant to the use of the median for all sample countries. I also measure cash relative to 
investments, defined as the sum of capital and R&D expenditures. In unreported findings, I find 
this cash holdings measure still displays a large and positive trend for all countries, except 
France and Japan.              
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1.5. International evidence on the determinants of corporate cash holdings 
1.5.1. Multivariate baseline analysis 
 In this section, I conduct multivariate analysis to examine whether the sample countries share 
the same determinants of corporate cash holdings. Among these are future investment 
opportunities, information asymmetry, firm size, cash flow, volatility of cash flows, substitutes 
for cash, and ability to access the external markets. Guided by the previous literature, I choose 
my model speciﬁcation for ﬁrm i at time t as follows: 
Cash ratioit = β0 + β1 CFVOLit + β2 LSIZEit + β3 MTBit + β4 Leverageit + β5 Cash Flowit 
                             + β6NWCit + β7CAPEXit + β8RDit + β9DIVit + εit                                                 (1)   
 
       For each sample country, I estimate Equation (1) employing the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
approach.
7
 Specifically, I estimate the regressions each year and then take the average of the 
parameter estimates from annual regressions. I compute t-statistics for the regression coefficients 
using the Newey and West (1987) procedure that is robust to autocorrelation out to three lags. I 
refer to this specification as the baseline regression thereafter. The firm characteristics employed 
are industry cash flow volatility (CFVOL), logarithm of real firm size in 2008 US dollar 
(LSIZE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), leverage, cash flow to assets, net working capital to assets 
(NWC), capital expenditure to assets (CAPEX), R&D expenses to sales (RD) and a dividend 
dummy variable (DIV) that takes a value of 1 for positive dividend payout in that year, and 0 
otherwise.  
The results presented in Panel A of Table 1.3 indicate that the signs of coefficients on firm 
size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, net working capital, capital expenditures, R&D expense 
ratio and cash flow volatility are mostly homogeneous across countries. For example, the 
                                                 
 7 Given that cross-sectional cash holdings are affected by the same factors such as business cycle and borrowing 
costs, our data might exhibit cross-sectional clusters. The Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach addresses cross-sectional 
clusters of observations or cross-sectional dependence among firms. 
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coefficients on R&D and market-to-book ratios are significantly positive in all regressions 
supporting the view that cash holdings are built up by firms with growth opportunities and high 
informational asymmetry to mitigate costs of foregoing profitable investments when terms in 
external markets are unfavorable. Also, the positive signs on cash flow volatility in all countries 
support the argument that firms hoard cash to hedge against future cash flow risks, in contrast to 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) who find that the cash flow volatility variable is insignificant 
for Japan during their sample period (1971-1994). My findings imply that during 1990s and 
2000s Japanese cash holdings became responsive to business risk. 
In addition, the point estimates on the leverage variable are significant and negative across all 
seven countries supporting Baskin’s (1987) argument that the cost of investing in liquid assets 
increases with debt financing and corroborates results in Kim et al. (1998), and Opler et al. 
(1999). This finding of a negative association between leverage and cash holdings fails to 
support Acharya et al.’s (2007) prediction that firms’ cash balances serve as a substitute for 
borrowing capacity. Not only is the impact of leverage and net working capital on cash holdings 
similar in sign across countries, but also the coefficients’ magnitudes on these variables have 
remarkably little variability among different countries.  
In contrast, I observe non-homogeneity across countries in the relevance of dividends and 
cash flow. The point estimates on the cash flow variable are negative and significant in UK and 
Germany but insignificant in remaining countries. The mixed results on the cash flow variable 
are also documented by previous research (Opler et al., 1999; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001). 
The negative sign on cash flow in UK and Germany is in support of Kim et al.’s (1998) 
argument that the higher the ability of the firm to generate internal cash flows, the lower the level 
of liquid assets.  
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The dividend status variable has a significantly negative association with cash holdings in the 
US, UK, Canada and Australia, consistent with the precautionary and transaction-based demand 
for cash holdings and suggesting that dividend payers with track records in the capital markets 
are less likely to be financially constrained and as a result have lesser need to maintain high cash 
reserves. However, in Germany, Japan and France, the association is positive and significant. 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) document a similar finding for Japan and Germany, and 
attribute this to the fact that firms in Japan and Germany pay dividends only in unusually 
profitable years. Given that the majority of firms in these three countries are dividend payers 
during my sample period, the evidence is more consistent with the argument that Japan and 
Germany’s bank-centered systems, where close connections with banks reduce informational 
opaqueness, rendering financially constrained firms (non-dividend payers) less motivated to hold 
precautionary cash. 
Given that firms with negative net income are more likely to be financially constrained, I 
further test the financial constraint model of cash holdings by including in the regression of 
Equation (1) a dummy variable, Neg, which takes a value of 1 if the firm has negative net 
income, and 0 otherwise. I then estimate the regressions separately using pooled data for (a) 
market-oriented countries (Australia, Canada, UK and the US) and (b) bank-centered countries 
(France, Germany and Japan). In unreported results, I find that the coefficient on Neg for the 
former four countries is positive and significant (0.023, t=16.79) while it is negative and 
significant for the latter three countries (-0.016, t=-9.46), confirming the finding from dividend 
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coefficient analysis that the well-documented financial constraint effect of cash holdings in the 
US does not apply to countries in bank-centered systems.
8
   
Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficients exposes large differences among countries in 
how cash policy is set. For example, the coefficients on CFVOL and R&D variables have the 
largest variability across the seven countries with Japan’s coefficients on CFVOL (1.55) and 
R&D (0.64) being by far the highest while the cash flow volatility coefficient for Australia 
(0.049) is the lowest of the seven countries.
9
 There are a number of plausible explanations for 
this disparity in the magnitude of these coefficients. First, Australia is unique among the sample 
countries in that a large fraction of its economy is in the development of natural resources where 
risk can be easily hedged with derivatives while Japanese firms specialize in industries that are 
less hedgeable. Therefore, even though Australia has the highest cash flow volatility among 
sample countries, the trivial correlation between cash holdings and cash flow risk for Australia is 
consistent with the argument that derivatives’ use and cash reserves are substitutes in hedging 
business risk.
10,11
 Alternatively, Australian firms may have a proclivity to bear greater risk, while 
Japanese firms may have a propensity toward being more conservative in setting cash policy 
because of scant appetite for risk. Hofstede (2001), who documents uncertainty avoidance across 
national cultures, establishes that among my seven sample countries, Australia ranks low on the 
uncertainty avoidance scale while Japan is classified as the most risk-averse. My findings fit this 
                                                 
 8 We estimate Eq. (1) with Neg variable for each country separately and find positive and significant coefficients 
on Neg in Australia, Canada, UK, and US, but significantly negative estimates for France, Germany and Japan. 
 9 We test the significance of the differences in coefficients on cash flow volatility (CFVOL) and R&D expenses 
between Japan and other countries and find Japan’s coefficients to be significantly higher (CFVOL 
difference=0.805, t=1.69; R&D difference=0.581, t=13.84) relative to all other countries together. Similarly, the 
coefficient on CFVOL is significantly lower in Australia than in all other countries (difference=-0.538, t=-3.79).  
 10 While Australian firms specializing in natural resources may hedge some of their exposure to commodity price 
movements, that by no means necessarily implies that our measure of variability will be low since our metric 
assesses volatility across a number of years that have exhibited large movements in commodity prices. 
 11 Gizychi and Lowe (2000) report an increased use of derivatives to manage risks in Australia since the second 
half of the 1990s. 
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pattern of uncertainty avoidance. Another plausible story is that Japanese firms favor 
accumulating larger cash balances per unit of risk for strategic reasons to maintain their 
incumbent leadership and to allow them to innovate faster than their rivals (Benoit, 1984). The 
high coefficients on CFVOL and R&D for Japan lend support to the notion that Japanese firms 
exploit the strategic component of cash policy. These three explanations are not mutually 
exclusive and hence, to some extent, each is applicable. To sum up, while my results document 
that these countries are fairly consistent in their utilization of some variables toward setting cash 
holdings policies (eg., leverage and NWC), they differ on their strategies of how much cash to 
keep when it comes to risk and information asymmetry.   
1.5.2. Robustness checks 
 
I run a series of robustness checks to validate the above findings. I first estimate both firm 
and time fixed effects for Equation (1) to address potential cross-sectional dependence across 
firms and serial correlations within firm, which may be induced by the use of the rolling eight-
year cash flow volatility. Panel B of Table 1.3 shows that coefficients generally remain 
unchanged with few exceptions. For instance, the coefficients on cash flow become positive and 
significant for all countries in the fixed effects regressions. Similar to previous research on US 
samples, the signs on cash flow volatility flip in most sample countries in fixed effects 
specifications. The dividend dummy coefficients become insignificant for most sample countries 
due to little within-firm variation.  
A second potential concern is that the increasing coverage of smaller firms by Worldscope 
may increase the median industry cash flow volatility even though real business conditions do 
not get riskier. To address this, I redo the analysis using market-value-weighted and book-value-
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weighted measures of industry cash flow risk and find that my inferences remain unchanged 
using these alternative metrics, albeit the coefficients on cash flow risk are generally lower.
12
  
I also estimate regressions of the change in cash on the changes in explanatory variables. 
One advantage of this specification is to remove unobserved heterogeneity over time and avoid 
omitted variable biases. In untabulated results, I find that the signs on most variables are fairly 
homogeneous across countries with the exception of the dividend status variable. The increases 
in cash flows and decrease in net working capital and capital expenditures contribute to the surge 
in cash in all countries, supporting the pecking order theory of cash holdings. Consistent with 
earlier findings, Japan still has the highest coefficients on the changes in cash flow volatility and 
R&D expenses. 
In addition, I re-estimate the baseline regressions using the logarithm of cash ratio as the 
dependent variable. The signs of the coefficients are largely identical to baseline regression for 
all countries, but the R-squares are slightly lower. I explore the sensitivity of my results to 
leverage and NWC by estimating a reduced model without these two variables since they 
respond to the same conditions as cash balances. My findings are robust to this specification but 
the coefficients on cash flow risk increase substantially for all countries.  
1.6. International evidence on the determinants of time trends in cash holdings 
 
The analysis in the above section exposes subtle variations in how firms in different countries 
set up cash policy. I next investigate the causes of secular cash pattern by exploring whether the 
observed trend can be explained by changing firm attributes across countries and whether the 
correlations between firm attributes and cash holdings have changed over time.  To do so, I 
                                                 
 12We also use a firm-level risk measure which results in losing more than 20% of the observations since younger 
firms do not have the needed data to compute this variable. This, of course, changes the composition of the sample 
to be weighted more heavily toward larger and more established firms. When using this risk measure, we obtain a 
positive but substantially lower coefficient on cash flow risk.  
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employ three different strategies: regression specifications with intercept change, time trend, and 
both slope and intercept changes. Then I execute out-of-sample analysis to examine the 
unexplained cash holdings in each of subsequent years relative to the base period (1991-1996). 
Next, I explore the contribution of specific factors to the change in cash balances over the sample 
period. Finally, I address Worldscope sample coverage, new listings and sample homogeneity 
concerns.   
1.6.1. Changing firm attributes and changes in cash holdings 
 
1.6.1.1. Analysis of intercept changes  
My analyses so far consider how firm characteristics influence cash holdings. I now extend 
the analysis by allowing for an intercept change to detect whether a demand shift in cash 
holdings occurs over time, i.e., I test whether the cash pattern is explainable by changes in firm 
attributes or not. To do that, I incorporate in the baseline regression specification two indicator 
variables which would permit intercept shifts for 1997-2002 and 2003-2008 periods represented 
by P(97-02) and P(03-08) respectively. These indicator variables also serve another purpose—
they control for the deregulation period in Japan which spanned 1989 to 1995. The coefficients 
on these two indicator variables are of interest—significantly positive coefficients would suggest 
that the cash pattern is not fully explainable by changing firm characteristics. In contrast, 
negative coefficients imply that factors unrelated to firm characteristics cannot explain the 
increases in cash holdings.   
The coefficients and significance of firm characteristics in Panel A of Table 1.4 remain 
almost unaltered after controlling for the two time periods.  The findings reveal that after 
controlling for firm characteristics, there is a significant downward shift in demand for cash in 
the US,  Japan, Canada and France for both subperiods,  a significant downward shift in UK and 
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Germany for the later period (2003-2008), and a positive and significant demand shift for cash in 
the later period in Australia.  
In the case of Japan, other factors unrelated to firm characteristics induce cash holdings to 
decline by 0.05 in 1997-2002 period and again by 0.08 in 2003-2008. This dramatic decline 
occurring over the 15-year period post financial deregulation indicates the enormity of rent-
extraction by Japanese banks before financial reforms. By the end of my sample period, cash 
policy in Japan has morphed into one that is more economically oriented as cash reserves leveled 
off. In an unreported result, I estimate baseline regressions for each of the three subperiods for 
Japan and find that R-square increases from 0.18 in 1991-1996 to 0.37 in 2003-2008, reaching 
the a similar level as other developed countries. This finding confirms the notion that cash policy 
in Japan became more economically oriented from 2003 onward. I also estimate the value of 
cash reserves in Japan for each subperiod using a modified Fama-French (1998) model (detailed 
later). Interestingly, the marginal value of cash in Japan during 1991-1996 period is only $0.42, 
suggesting that investors discounted the value of cash when Japanese firms were obligated to 
hold excessive amounts in cash balances. In the two later periods, cash value increases steadily 
($0.57 for 1997-2002; $1.08 for 2003-2008), reflecting more optimal cash holdings by Japanese 
firms over time.  
My results for Japan complement Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), who document that Japanese firms historically held elevated levels of cash. However, 
regulatory financial reforms in Japan enacted during 1989-1995 enabled firms to reduce their 
reliance on bank financing. The combination of evidence from univariate and multivariate 
analysis indicates that Japan exhibits some uniqueness among sample countries with regard to 
the cash holdings policy. My analysis provides support to the notion that the cash policy in 
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Japanese firms was far less economically oriented during deregulation period. A broader 
implication that can be drawn from this evidence is that institutional structures influence firms’ 
liquidity policy.  
1.6.1.2. Time trend analysis  
 
I next utilize another approach to test demand shift for cash by including a time trend 
variable, YEAR, as an independent variable in the baseline regressions. There are two 
advantages for this regression specification. First, my analysis thus far indicates that both the 
dependent variable and explanatory variables exhibit certain trending over time. Thus the 
inclusion of a time trend variable will detrend the variables to avoid potentially spurious results. 
Second, allowing for the trend in the regressions explicitly recognizes that cash reserves may be 
changing over time for reasons essentially unrelated to firm attributes. 
Panel B of Table 1.4 provides the regression estimates with time trend variable. The findings 
are interesting as they draw a completely different picture of the pattern in cash holdings than the 
one discussed earlier. For example, the coefficients on YEAR reveal that cash holdings decrease 
the most in Japan at a rate of 0.50%, followed by Canada (0.30%), UK (0.20%) and the US 
(0.10%). The cash ratio does not change in France and Germany while Australia is the only 
country with a positive and significant coefficient on the time trend variable. The significant 
declines in cash reserves across most countries seem to suggest that improved efficiencies in 
handling cash and developments in financial engineering reduce transaction and precautionary 
needs to hold cash. Further, the additional evidence in Panel B suggests that time-varying firm 
attributes documented earlier explain the positive and significant shifts in corporate cash 
holdings for all countries except Australia. However, the results in Panel B show an increase in 
cash holdings of only 0.20%, compared to 0.92% before controlling for firm characteristics, 
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suggesting that even though time-varying firm characteristics explain most of the cash holdings’ 
changes, other factors unrelated to known firm characteristics are also behind the changes in 
Australian corporate cash holdings. In the case of Japan, the decline of 0.20% in cash holdings 
reported earlier understates the drop in cash reserves, which amounts to 0.50% after controlling 
for firm characteristics. If I assume that the decline in cash holdings from the US, Canada, and 
UK (mean of about 0.20%) is due to improved efficiencies in cash management, I can infer that 
the drop in cash balances in Japan due to deregulation is approximately 0.30% per year. 
1.6.1.3. Analysis of slope and intercept changes 
 
The analysis in the previous section provides hints that the evolution in firm attributes over 
time is behind the upward trend in corporate cash holdings in most, but no all, sample countries 
when allowing for intercept change. It may be the case that the relation between firm attributes 
and cash ratios has changed over time and this change causes the intercept change. To further 
test this, I interact the two indicator variables, P(97-02) and P(03-08), with each explanatory 
variable from my baseline regression. The analysis essentially tests whether there are both slope 
and intercept changes. This is equivalent to estimating a regression separately for each of the 
three subperiods.  
I obtain several remarkable findings reported in Panel C of Table 1.4. First, full-blown chow 
tests, which test the significance of both period indicator variables and interaction terms, indicate 
that there are structural changes over time for all sample countries except Canada. Examination 
of coefficients indicates no significant changes in the link between cash ratio and firm 
characteristics in subsequent periods for Canada. Even though for France the coefficients for 
firm variables in subsequent periods are similar to the base period (1991-1996), they are 
significant for a number of the variables bolstering the importance of some firm attributes to cash 
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ratio. In conjunction with significant intercept changes for US firms, I also observe a significant 
shift in slopes in the same direction as predicted for cash flow volatility, leverage, R&D 
expenses and dividend as well as a significant shift in slopes opposite to predicted direction for 
firm size, market to book, net working capital and capital expenditures, which implies that US 
firms choose to increase cash reserves as firm attributes evolve toward a more risky profile. In 
addition, the drop in US cash holdings attributed to change in intercept associated with the two 
period indicator variables is much larger (-0.15 and -0.12) than that in Panel A of Table 1.4. The 
remaining countries are positioned between sharp slope shift in the US and no shift in Canada. 
These results point to changes in managerial views on the importance of firm attributes for cash 
policy decisions. However, the significance of these changes is limited given that the model’s 
explanatory power with both intercept and slope changes does not improve significantly relative 
to the model with only intercept change.  
Second, the coefficients on the two indicator variables fall into three groups: (a) negative and 
significant (US and Japan), (b) negative and insignificant (Canada and France), and (c) positive 
and significant (UK, Germany and Australia). The first two outcomes for the indicator variables 
(a and b) imply that factors other than firm characteristics cannot explain the secular increases in 
cash holdings—confirming my earlier findings. For the third group, the positive and significant 
coefficients on indicator variables suggest that after allowing for structural changes in the 
determinants of cash holdings, other factors contribute to the secular increase in cash holdings. In 
Japan, the negative but insignificant coefficient on the indicator variable, P(03-08), suggests that 
the decline in cash holdings due to diminishing power of banks levels off in 2003-2008 period. 
Finally, the negative coefficient on cash flow volatility in the period of 1991-1996 in Japan 
reflects unresponsiveness of firms to business risk when setting cash policy. However, the 
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significant increase in the impact of cash flow volatility on cash holdings supports my previous 
finding that cash policy at Japanese firms has become more economically oriented in the 2000s. 
1.6.2. Out-of-sample analysis 
 
The combination of tests in the above section show that firms in the US, Canada, Japan and 
France actually maintain less liquid assets in later years relative to the base period after 
considering the changes in firm characteristics while cash balances in Australian firms increase 
beyond levels expected from changes in firm attributes. The evidence in Germany and UK is 
mixed since I obtain significant cash increases in only one of three tests. In this section, I use 
out-of-sample analysis, first, to demonstrate the unexplained cash holdings in subsequent years 
relative to the base period, and second, to provide a further test on whether the increases in cash 
holdings are explainable by changing firm attributes. To achieve this, I employ Fama-Macbeth 
(1973) approach to estimate baseline regressions for base period (using specification in Table 
1.3), and then apply the coefficients to the later years to compute the predicted cash ratio. The 
deviations of actual cash from predicted cash ratios, henceforth referred to as deviations, are 
reported in Table 1.5. Positive deviations imply the existence of unexplained cash holdings in 
that year, suggesting that changing firm characteristics cannot explain the cash trend. 
The results in Table 1.5 highlight that in most years occurring after base period the deviations 
are positive and significant in Australia and Germany with the under-prediction averaging 2.9% 
of assets in Australia and 4.1% in Germany pointing to an increase in cash reserves in the later 
years. For the UK, the average deviation is small in magnitude (0.5%) with significant positive 
deviations occurring only intermittently. Meanwhile, the average deviation indicates that firms in 
France (-0.5%), Canada (-1.2%), Japan (-6.3%), and the US (-1.6%) in aggregate did not hold 
higher cash than expected over the 1997-2008 period. In Japan, the change in firm characteristics 
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induces a positive trend in cash holdings, but the effect is not strong enough to counteract the 
declining trend induced by the diminishing power of banks. The collective evidence so far 
suggests that even though all countries (except Japan) exhibit similar secular cash patterns to the 
US and experience similar evolution in firm attributes, changing firm attributes in Australia and 
Germany cannot completely explain the rise in cash balances. The analysis indicates that other 
factors contribute to the observed cash pattern. These other factors could include agency costs, 
external financing costs, macro-economic changes or even other firm-specific factors which are 
not characterized in the current prevailing model on the determinants of cash holdings. 
1.6.3. The impact of evolution in firm attributes on increases in cash holdings 
 
In this section, I analyze how changes in firm characteristics contribute to the increases in 
corporate cash holdings in each sample country. I focus on how changes in firm characteristics 
affect the increases in cash ratios since I document an increase in cash holdings in six out of 
seven countries. My procedure proceeds as follows. First, I run Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
regressions over the base period (1991-1996) and obtain coefficients for each independent 
variable. Then I multiply the mean value for each independent variable over this subperiod by 
the corresponding coefficient (from step 1) to obtain the contribution of each variable to the cash 
ratio for base period. I repeat the same process for the subperiod 2003-2008. Finally, I compute 
the difference in the contribution of each variable to cash holdings between these two subperiods 
and corresponding t-statistics.  
The results presented in Table 1.6 demonstrate that sample countries exhibit a strong 
commonality in the influence of firm-specific factors on the increases in cash holdings. The four 
most important factors common to sample countries are the change in net working capital, the 
change in R&D, the change in cash flow volatility, and change in growth options.  The change in  
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Table 1.6 Determinants of Changes in Cash Holdings 
  
     This table presents the contributions of firm characteristics to cash holdings for the periods 1991-1996 
and 2003- 2008, as well as the difference in the contribution of each characteristic between the two periods. I 
estimate a model of cash holdings separately for 1991-1996 and 2003-2008 periods using Fama-Macbeth 
(1973) approach and apply the coefficients obtained to each corresponding variable to estimate the 
contribution of each variable to the cash holdings in each period.  
          
Country CFVOL LSIZE MTB Leverage Cash Flow NWC CAPEX RD DIV 
Australia          
1991-1996 -0.003 -0.132 0.054 -0.033 0.003 -0.008 -0.014 0.007 -0.004 
2003-2008 0.016 -0.150 0.057 -0.065 -0.002 0.001 -0.007 0.015 -0.015 
Difference 0.019 -0.018 0.003 -0.032 -0.005 0.009 0.007 0.008 -0.011 
t_statistics   6.49   -3.59   0.34 -18.40  -0.73 22.64   2.60   5.25   -2.88 
Canada          
1991-1996 0.023 -0.056 0.031 -0.085 -0.001 -0.011 -0.037 0.005 -0.017 
2003-2008 0.051 -0.088 0.037 -0.061 0.001 -0.001 -0.033 0.008 -0.011 
Difference 0.027 -0.032 0.005 0.024 0.002 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.006 
t_statistics 31.14 -11.87 57.82   6.85   5.37   3.31   3.49  4.14  1.07 
France          
1991-1996 0.031 -0.107 0.025 -0.061 0.019 -0.016 -0.030 0.001 0.016 
2003-2008 0.002 -0.079 0.037 -0.064 -0.001 -0.004 -0.015 0.013 0.008 
Difference -0.029 0.028 0.011 -0.003 -0.020 0.012 0.014 0.012 -0.008 
t_statistics -342.77   9.57   2.13   -2.34 -11.28   6.73   6.72 54.72 -15.40 
Germany          
1991-1996 -0.004 -0.017 0.031 -0.057 -0.003 -0.023 -0.011 0.004 0.025 
2003-2008 0.024 -0.154 0.035 -0.075 -0.003 -0.012 -0.013 0.016 -0.002 
Difference 0.028 -0.137 0.003 -0.018 0.000 0.011 -0.002 0.012 -0.027 
t_statistics 138.84 -34.44   2.52   -6.28 -0.04   4.73   -2.09   5.02 -12.04 
Japan          
1991-1996 0.011 -0.097 0.009 -0.052 0.005 0.007 -0.043 0.005 0.024 
2003-2008 0.057 -0.215 0.065 -0.065 -0.003 -0.002 -0.019 0.011 0.004 
Difference 0.046 -0.118 0.057 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 0.024 0.005 -0.019 
t_statistics 38.91 -12.37 11.60   -1.36   -0.87 -11.72   3.26   4.70 -11.36 
UK          
1991-1996 0.032 0.042 0.042 -0.048 0.000 -0.008 -0.019 0.006 -0.014 
2003-2008 0.010 -0.018 0.058 -0.064 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.012 -0.017 
Difference -0.022 -0.060 0.016 -0.016 0.001 0.010 0.014 0.006 -0.003 
t_statistics   -5.05 -46.72   2.73   -8.06   0.10 11.39 16.04   6.16   -0.49 
US          
1991-1996 0.052 -0.193 0.031 -0.083 0.000 -0.043 -0.035 0.006 -0.016 
2003-2008 0.063 -0.065 0.008 -0.081 -0.001 -0.011 -0.027 0.013 -0.010 
Difference 0.011 0.128 -0.023 0.002 -0.001 0.031 0.008 0.007 0.006 
t_statistics 11.16 62.18   -3.33   0.79   -0.09 168.04 13.74 11.19   5.65 
 
net working capital ranks as the top four contributing factors in all sample countries except Japan 
while the change in R&D expenses to sales dominates in five countries except Canada and the 
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US. The change in cash flow volatility ranks in the top four in the US, Canada, Germany, Japan 
and Australia while the change in market-to-book ranks in the top list in Canada, UK, Germany 
and Japan. In UK and France, the effect of cash flow volatility on cash holdings decreases from 
1991-1996 to 2003-2008, while the impact of growth options on cash holdings decreases in the 
US. The above findings suggest that the determinants for cash changes cluster on variables that 
relate to risk such as growth opportunities, R&D outlays, and industry cash flow volatility.
13
  
1.6.4. Worldscope sample coverage, new listings, and sample homogeneity across countries 
 
    One concern is that the time trend in cash holdings that I document could be a result of 
expanding Worldscope coverage over time of smaller ﬁrms that have a tendency to hold more 
liquid assets. By beginning my study period in 1991, I try to avoid this bias. Nonetheless, if a 
significant expansion in Worldscope coverage occurs after 1991, this would tilt my results to 
empirically find an upward trend in cash reserves when none exists. The selection bias is 
ameliorated to the extent that a fraction of the added firms to Worldscope reflect newly listed 
companies. To explore possible Worldscope coverage bias, I conduct a number of tests.  
First, I re-estimate my analysis for US firms using Compustat data over the same time period 
and compare these to Worldscope estimates. Since Compustat coverage of US firms is complete, 
it is free from selection bias. I present the comparison results in Panel A of Table 1.7. The data 
on cash ratios reveals that Worldscope coverage approximates the Compustat data around 1994. 
Despite the difference in early coverage between Worldscope and Compustat, the time trends  in 
cash holdings are qualitatively identical for both samples with growth rate of cash  
                                                 
 13 Our results for the US are similar to those reported by Bates et al. (2009) as three of top four most important 
variables are the same even though their time period somewhat differs from ours and they apply a different 
methodology. Consistent with their findings, we also document that the firm size effect wanes in the US in the 
2000s.  
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      Table 1.7 Analyses of Worldscope coverage, and sample homogeneity across countries 
 
     Panel A of this table tests Worldscope sample coverage bias by comparing estimates for US firms 
using the Worldscope data with those from Compustat database. Deviation is the cross-sectional average 
of differences between actual and predicted cash ratios, which are obtained by applying Fama-Macbeth 
(1973) coefficients estimated over the period of 1991-1996 to the corresponding variables in subsequent 
years. Growth is estimated from the regression of mean yearly cash ratio on variable ―YEAR‖ from 1991 
to 2008. . Panel B reports percentage of firms in each size deciles for each sample country. All firm-year 
observations for seven countries are pooled together and sorted into deciles based on book value of assets 
in 2008 US dollars. 
 
Panel A: Worldscope vs. Compustat for US firms 
    
 Worldscope sample  Compustat sample 
Year Cash Deviation t-Stat  Cash Deviation t-Stat 
1991 0.136    0.158   
1992 0.143    0.167   
1993 0.153    0.178   
1994 0.158    0.162   
1995 0.165    0.177   
1996 0.192    0.199   
1997 0.196 0.005 2.036  0.198 0.006 2.465 
1998 0.201 -0.019 -7.320  0.184 -0.002 -0.704 
1999 0.221 -0.045 -14.451  0.207 -0.008 -2.949 
2000 0.209 -0.017 -6.134  0.209 -0.008 -2.755 
2001 0.215 -0.019 -6.186  0.212 -0.022 -7.124 
2002 0.214 -0.021 -6.988  0.210 -0.019 -6.374 
2003 0.231 -0.023 -6.841  0.228 -0.014 -4.385 
2004 0.240 -0.016 -5.002  0.246 -0.009 -2.801 
2005 0.238 -0.014 -4.027  0.245 -0.012 -3.717 
2006 0.235 -0.016 -4.835  0.246 -0.011 -3.341 
2007 0.230 -0.008 -2.321  0.244 -0.011 -3.218 
2008 0.210 -0.003 -0.813  0.224 -0.005 -1.593 
Growth 0.577%    0.520%   
Panel B: Size distribution                     
 
Australia 
 
Canada 
 
France 
 
Germany 
 
Japan 
 
UK 
 
US 
              Deciles Pctg   Pctg   Pctg   Pctg   Pctg   Pctg   Pctg 
Smallest 27.16 
 
12.42 
 
8.21 
 
6.80 
 
0.43 
 
12.50 
 
12.13 
2 15.87 
 
13.58 
 
14.32 
 
10.93 
 
2.11 
 
13.69 
 
10.93 
3 10.98 
 
12.32 
 
12.15 
 
11.94 
 
4.88 
 
13.22 
 
10.63 
4 8.90 
 
10.67 
 
11.05 
 
11.67 
 
8.66 
 
10.28 
 
10.26 
5 7.33 
 
9.95 
 
9.27 
 
11.04 
 
12.01 
 
9.08 
 
9.59 
6 6.58 
 
8.99 
 
9.40 
 
9.88 
 
15.17 
 
6.79 
 
9.07 
7 6.26 
 
8.48 
 
7.91 
 
8.52 
 
16.09 
 
6.37 
 
9.19 
8 5.77 
 
7.64 
 
7.45 
 
8.42 
 
15.61 
 
6.50 
 
9.59 
9 6.06 
 
9.08 
 
8.42 
 
8.85 
 
13.53 
 
8.22 
 
9.71 
Largest 5.10   6.88   11.82   11.96   11.52   13.35   8.90 
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ratio being 0.58% for Worldscope sample and 0.52% for Compustat firms (based on time trend 
regressions for full sample period).  
In addition, if the Worldscope coverage bias drives my findings, I would expect to observe 
lower predicted cash ratios and correspondingly higher deviations of actual cash from the 
predicted cash. The results in columns 3 and 6 in Table 1.7 show that the deviations of actual 
cash from the predicted cash ratios obtained using coefficients from the base period are almost 
the same for both samples in subsequent years. Since the upward trend documented with 
Compustat data yields similar inferences when using Worldscope data, this provides some 
reassurance that my ﬁndings are not due to biases related to expanding Worldscope coverage.14 
To test the effect of new additions to the sample either due to new listings or to expanding 
Worldscope coverage, I analyze the change in cash holdings for subsample firms from base 
period 1991-1996 (referred to as constant sample) by calculating cash ratios and deviations of 
actual cash from predicted cash for constant subsample of firms. For brevity, I do not report the 
results in the table. The findings show that constant sample firms exhibit upward trends in cash 
balances in Australia, Canada, Germany and the US—albeit at a lower pace than the total 
sample—while cash holdings remain unchanged in France and decline in UK. In Japan, the 
constant sample firms decrease their cash balances more substantially than the total sample. 
Deviations of actual cash from predicted cash yield similar inferences. For example, US 
deviations are wider for constant sample firms than for the whole sample, indicating that the 
former sample firms hold even lower cash than predicted. In Germany, even though the total 
                                                 
 14 I compare the cash ratio and leverage values from Global Vantage for 1991 obtained by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) for six sample countries common between our study and theirs to those from Worldscope. We find that for 
four out of six countries, the cash ratios for Worldscope firms are higher and the leverage is lower, an indication that 
by 1991 Worldscope has already incorporated more small firms in its composition than Global Vantage.  
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sample firms hold substantially more cash than predicted in recent years, the constant sample 
exhibits modest positive deviations. The evidence suggests that the documented cash pattern is to 
some extent driven by firms entering the sample after 1996, consistent with previous findings on 
cash holdings in US (Bates et al., 2009) and dividend policy (Denis and Osobov, 2008).  
Since firm size is an important determinant of cash holdings, I now turn to examine the 
possible bias induced by heterogeneity in size distribution of companies covered by Worldscope 
across countries. To explore sample homogeneity, I pool all firms from the seven countries and 
sort them into deciles based on their real size in 2008 US dollars. As the data in Panel B of Table 
1.7 shows, the size distribution of sample firms exhibits homogeneity across countries except for 
Japan, with a preponderance of firms larger than the median value, and Australia, which has 
more small firms with value lower than median.  
1.7. Analysis of agency motives and other factors behind the changes in corporate cash 
holdings 
 
1.7.1. Tests of agency motive 
 
In the previous sections, I document that while the time-varying firm-specific factors can 
fully explain the cash patterns in some countries, for other countries a portion of the secular trend 
remains unexplainable. In this section, I investigate whether the secular change in cash holdings 
can be attributable to agency motives. As articulated by Jensen (1986), managers have incentives 
to increase cash holdings to serve their self-interests. I tackle the agency problems in two ways.
15
 
In the first test, I examine the association between growth opportunities and excess cash over  
time.  I argue that in the presence of  managerial opportunism in setting cash  
                                                 
 15 I analyze whether firms take advantage of temporarily favorable conditions of external financing to build up 
cash buffers by regressing change in cash on funds from external financing and funds from operations. We find that 
German firms exhibit the greatest keenness to take advantage of lower costs of external financing to accumulate 
cash reserves irrespective of firm size, suggestive of agency motive where German firms have inclinations to build 
up cash whenever there is an opportunity to do so.   
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policy, firms would choose to accumulate cash instead of disbursing it out to shareholders even if 
they do not have good investment opportunities. Excess cash in firms with superior investment 
prospects are more likely to be put to good uses than in firms with poor opportunities. Therefore, 
firms with low growth opportunities holding higher levels of excess cash relative to firms with 
high growth opportunities is taken as a sign of agency motivation. To test this conjecture, I group 
sample firms in each country for each year by the median value of market-to-book ratio for that 
year. For each firm, I compute excess cash using the residuals from the regressions in Panel A of 
Table 1.3, then estimate the mean excess cash for each of the two groups for the three 
subperiods.  
Three points emerge from the results reported in Table 1.8. First, in the US, UK, and Canada, 
firms with high growth options consistently hold positive excess cash while firms with poor 
growth opportunities maintain negative excess cash over all three subperiods, indicating that the 
agency motive does not play a role in the increases in cash holdings in these countries. Likewise, 
the evidence does not support an agency motive in Australia and France. Second, German firms 
with poor growth opportunities hold positive excess cash relative to firms with superior 
investment opportunities, suggestive of an agency motive behind the secular cash pattern. 
Finally, while both high and low growth option firms in Japan hold positive excess cash in the 
first two subperiods—with low growth options firms holding more—the trend reverses in the 
most recent period which implies that the suboptimal cash levels at Japanese firms induced by 
rent-extraction had a greater impact on low growth firms.  
In the second test, I investigate the value of change in cash over the recent two subperiods. 
Since I am interested in the secular changes in cash, I focus on the value of change in cash, not 
the value of the level of cash. Specifically, I examine whether an additional dollar in cash in 
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firms with excess cash contributes less to a change in firm value relative to firms that experience 
a decline in cash balances after controlling for firm characteristic changes. I reason that since 
increasing cash reserves beyond justifiable levels facilitates extraction of private benefits, 
investors would place lower value on the cash increase. I use a positive (negative) deviation of 
actual cash holdings from the predicted cash ratios estimated from the coefficients of the base 
period to denote an increase (decrease) in cash holdings after accounting for changing firm 
attributes. Guided by previous literature, I use a modified version of Fama and French’s (1998) 
model to estimate the value of change in cash. The regression specification is as follows: 
     

MVi, t
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dCi, t  2
TAi, t
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dCi, t
TAi, t
*PosDev  19*PosDev  i, t (2)
 
where Xi,t is the level of variable X in year t, dXi,t is the change in the level of X from year t-2 to 
year t, dXi,t+2 indicates a change of X from year t to year t+2, MVi,t is the market value of firm i at 
the end of year t calculated as the stock price times outstanding shares plus book value of short-
term and long-term debt, NAi,t is the book value of total assets minus cash and marketable 
securities, Ei,t is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, RDi,t is R&D expenditure, Di,t is 
common dividends, Ii,t is interest expense, Ci,t is cash and marketable securities which corresponds 
to cash holdings, TAi,t is the book value of total assets, PosDev is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the actual cash is greater than the predicted cash ratio, and 0 otherwise. My interest is 
in coefficients β16 and β18. If agency conflicts are behind the changing cash policy, the magnitude 
of β16 should be small while β18 would take on a negative sign, indicating that market participants 
place lower value on every additional dollar increase in cash.  
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Table 1.9 reports the results for Equation (2). Based on the value of a one-dollar change in cash 
(β16), firms in the US ($1.68), Canada ($1.66) and UK ($1.24) experience the highest change in 
firm value with an additional dollar of cash buildup contributing the least to a change in firm value 
in Germany (0.49). More crucially, I find that in Germany the value of a one-dollar increase in 
cash is substantially lower in firms which hold more cash than predicted ($0.20) when compared to 
firms maintaining lower than predicted cash holdings ($0.49), the difference significant at 5% 
level.
16
 This evidence points to an agency motive behind the cash buildup in Germany. In 
combination, the two tests confirm that the agency motive plays a crucial role in the substantial 
increase in cash holdings in Germany.  
1.7.2. Tests of relevance of other factors for Australia  
The existence of unexplained cash holdings and little evidence of an agency motive in Australia 
suggest that other factors contribute to the rise in cash balances. These other factors include 
external financing costs, macro-economic changes or even other firm-specific factors which are 
not characterized in the current prevailing model on the determinants of cash holdings. To 
address the case of Australia, I conduct three additional tests by augmenting the baseline 
regression with proxies for industry competition, external financing costs and capital market 
developments and re-estimating  the  regression strategies  allowing  for  intercept  change, time 
trend, and both intercept and slope changes. For brevity, I present in Table 1.10 only the results 
for variables of interest for intercept change and time trend regressions.  
Morellec and Nikolov (2009) find that the intensity of industry competition can explain the 
secular  increase  in cash  holdings in  the US.  So I  add the  Herfindahl  Index  estimated  as the 
                                                 
     16 Interestingly, the data also shows a negative coefficient on β18 for the US. However, when considering the 
impact of both β16 and β18, the value of one-dollar change in cash in firms that hold higher than predicted cash levels 
still garners one of the highest changes in firm value ($1.42) among sample countries.   
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Table 1.10 Regressions on relevance of other factors to the change 
 in cash holdings in Australia 
 
    This table presents regressions testing whether intensity of industry competition, external financing costs, and 
capital market development are capable of explaining changing cash holdings in Australia over 1991-2008 
period. Dependent variable is cash and marketable securities to total assets. Firm characteristics included in 
regressions are industry cash flow volatility, natural logarithm of real firm total assets, market-to-book ratio, 
leverage, cash flow to assets, net working capital to assets, capital expenditure to assets, R&D to sales and 
dividend dummy. Industry competition (HFDL) is estimated as the squared root of the squared sales market 
share of all firms in an industry sector. External financing cost is proxied by bank lending rate (LendRate). The 
capital market development variables are credit provided to the private sector (PrivCrd), stock market 
capitalization (MktCap), and bond market capitalization (BondCap), normalized by gross domestic product 
(GDP). Two indicator variables, P(97-02) and P(03-08), denote two subperiods (1997-2002) and (2003-2008) 
respectively and YEAR is time trend variable. For brevity, the coefficients of firm characteristics are unreported. 
t-statistics are based on standard errors robust to clustering by firm.  
  
 Industry Competition   External Financing Costs   Capital Market Development 
Variable Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat   Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat   Coef. t-Stat Coef.  t-Stat 
P(97-02) 0.004 0.58    0.007 0.77    -0.011 -1.55   
P(03-08) 0.015 1.97    0.017 2.04    -0.014 -1.26   
YEAR   0.002 2.55    0.002 3.55    -0.005 -1.67 
HFDL  0.056 3.90 0.057 3.98           
LendRate      0.003 1.17 0.005 2.15      
PrivCrd           0.001 2.30 0.002 2.15 
MktCap           0.000 0.48 0.000 -0.17 
BondCap                     -0.118 -0.42 0.178 0.48 
R2 0.411 0.415   0.414 0.414  0.411 0.411 
N 7,506 7,506   7,506 7,506   7,506 7,506 
 
squared root of the squared sales market share of all firms in an industry sector into the baseline 
regression and redo the analyses. Table 1.10 shows that industry competition has a significant 
and positive link to cash holdings; however, the addition of this variable has no bearing on the 
time trend and period indicator variables. Second, I control for the lending rate, obtained from 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, as a proxy for external financing costs in the 
baseline regression. The findings demonstrate a positive relationship between external financing 
costs and cash holdings; however, the inclusion of this macro variable does not impact 
conclusions from firm characteristic variables and time variables.  
In the last test, I ask whether developments in the Australian financial system are behind the 
cash pattern. The Australian financial markets underwent major deregulation in the mid-1980s 
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which intensified competition among financial institutions, giving rise to losses in the financial 
sector in early 1990s and correspondingly diminishing the credit available to nonfinancial firms. 
A series of financial reforms and the acceptance of the recommendations of Wallis Inquiry 
Report (1997) brought about changes in the regulatory environment which fueled the growth of 
direct and indirect financing in Australia since the second half of the 1990s (Gizycki and Lowe, 
2000). To model whether these macro-economic changes contribute to the changes in cash ratios, 
I augment Equation (1) with three additional variables representing capital market developments 
in Australia: domestic credit provided to the private sector (PrivCrd), stock market capitalization 
(MktCap) and bond market capitalization (BondCap), all normalized with gross domestic 
product (GDP). These measures, collected from World Banks’ World Development Indicators, 
are standard proxies for market development in the literature.  
The findings reveal that while the signs and significance of other variables remain 
unchanged, the time trend variable and period indicator variables become negative or 
insignificant, suggesting that developments in the domestic credit market add explanatory power 
to the changes in cash balances in Australia. In particular, I find that the credit provided to the 
private sector in the earliest period (1991-1996) of 64% of GDP is by far the shallowest debt 
market among my sample countries an indication of lack of full access to credit by Australian 
firms. The Australian credit sector expanded sharply by 2003-2008 when it accounted for 108% 
of GDP. The marked increase in the depth of the credit markets has a significant impact on 
corporate cash balances suggesting that Australian firms’ cash balances were at a curtailed level 
in the beginning of my sample period due to market conditions—more succinctly, the secular 
upward cash trend seems to be driven by a cash deficiency during the earlier part of my sample 
period. This argument is bolstered by the fact that Australia has the lowest mean cash ratio in the 
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base period (8.4%) among sample countries. My findings are consistent with the perspective that 
functioning and development of financial markets can have a pronounced impact on cash policy.  
1.8. Conclusion  
 
This chapter documents compelling evidence that the secular upward trend in corporate cash 
holdings observed for the US extends to a sample of industrialized countries for 1991-2008 
period, with the exception of Japan where firms experience a substantial decline in cash 
balances—i.e., the cash pattern is almost systemic in industrialized countries. The secular cash 
trend is accompanied by substantial leverage declines in all countries with Japanese firms 
deleveraging the most. The unique situation in Japan is due to rent extraction behavior of its 
powerful banking sector, which forced Japanese corporations to hold large cash balances during 
the 1980s. My evidence highlights that Japanese firms’ cash policies have become more 
economically oriented since the 2000s.  
 I also find that firms across sample countries exhibit, on the one hand, commonality in the 
determinants of cash holdings, suggesting that the correlation between firm attributes and cash 
holdings documented in the US is not spurious, and on the other hand, differences in their cash 
policies, pointing to a uniqueness of cash decisions in each country. My analysis reveals that 
firm attributes evolve substantially over the past two decades in all seven countries. Sample 
firms become smaller and riskier, and shift away from investing in inventory and physical capital 
toward investing in R&D projects. In a nutshell, corporations in these industrialized countries 
have undergone major changes, which have driven firms to elevate their cash balances for 
precautionary purposes. Despite this convergent evolutionary change in firm attributes across 
countries, the changes in modeled firm characteristics can explain the increases in cash only in 
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some countries, namely, Canada, France, and the US. Firms in Australia and Germany increase 
their cash balances beyond levels expected from the evolution in known firm attributes.  
The analysis from a battery of tests on whether the agency motive drives the secular pattern 
in cash reserves provides evidence that German firms’ cash policy setting suffers from agency 
problems. In the case of Australia, my tests show that the upward cash pattern is driven by 
shallow private credit markets which curtailed corporate cash holdings during the earlier period 
of my study. My analysis highlights that the functioning of the financial system is crucial to 
corporate cash policy as shown in Japan and Australia.   
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Chapter 2: Agency Conflict and Corporate Cash Holdings 
Around the World: New Evidence 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The elevated levels of corporate cash holdings can be detrimental to shareholders because of 
possible value-destroying uses of available funds. Free cash flow theory contends that sizable 
cash reserves facilitate insiders’ extraction of private benefits at the expense of outside 
shareholders through overinvestment when interests between insiders and outside shareholders 
diverge (Jensen (1986) and Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
17
 As cash holdings account for an 
increasingly greater portion of corporate assets,
18
 the adverse effect on shareholders’ wealth of 
misallocation of internal funds can be substantial. This chapter explores the impact of agency 
conflict on the use of liquid assets and the resulting impact on firms’ profitability, and in so 
doing, addresses three questions. Does agency conflict have any bearing on the level of cash? 
How does the agency conflict affect the dissipation of cash, as well as how do agency costs of 
excess cash influence the firm’s investment decisions? And to what extent the use of excess cash 
and the presence of agency conflict together impinge on firms’ operating performance? 
I employ country-level investor protection mechanisms to proxy for agency conflict between 
insiders, controlling shareholders or managers, and outside shareholders. One benefit of 
investigating the connection between agency conflict and cash holdings in the international 
setting is the ability to take advantage of the large and multifaceted variations in agency costs 
across countries, which are unavailable to single-country studies. Prior research has shown that 
                                                 
17 In countries with dispersed ownership structure, the separation of ownership and control arises from the free 
rider problem faced by atomistic shareholders due to the control of the firm by professional managers. However, in 
countries with concentrated ownership structures, where controlling shareholders own a disproportional share of 
control rights, the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights are at the root of agency costs.   
      18 Bates et al. (2009) report that US firms’ cash holdings have doubled from 1980 to 2006 and Iskandar-Datta 
and Jia (2010) document that this upward trend in cash reserves is also exhibited in other industrialized countries.   
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the legal structures represent a fruitful approach to understand corporate governance and agency 
conflicts. The expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth by insiders is at the core of agency 
conflict in many countries. Investor protection mechanisms such as laws and their enforcement, 
to a large extent, are the key governance levers through which outside investors are protected 
from insider expropriation. To capture a broader and more complete scope of investor protection, 
I extend previous research by using both the content of legal rights granted to minority 
shareholders by law and the quality of enforcement of these rights to depict governance systems.  
Cash holdings can serve as financial slack that diminishes the transaction costs of raising 
funds. Firms may also hold precautionary cash to avoid foregoing future positive NPV projects 
when external financing is expensive. If cash policy is based solely on economic fundamentals, 
there should be no connection between agency conflict and cash holdings. However, the free 
cash flow theory suggests that self-interested managers have incentives to increase the amount of 
assets under their control and, therefore, cash is often retained or invested inefficiently rather 
than disbursed to shareholders. La Porta et al. (2000a) find evidence supporting this argument by 
documenting that weaker investor protection is associated with lower dividend payouts. The 
implication of this finding is that firms under weaker external governance structures retain a 
greater portion of their earnings. Whether these large retained earnings ultimately translate into 
high levels of cash reserves depends on the tradeoff between convenience and empire-building 
preferences of managers or controlling shareholders. If self-interested managers value empire-
building the most, I would observe quicker dissipation of cash and correspondingly a lower cash 
level when external investor protection is weak, and vice versa.   
Previous studies examining agency conflict and corporate cash holdings for the US report 
contradictory evidence. Opler et al. (1999) find little evidence that excessive cash reserves are 
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wasted in the US. Similarly, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) report that firms with persistent large 
cash holdings do not squander the resources and therefore, the large excess cash reserves  do not 
hinder firms’ performance. In contrast, Blanchard et al. (1994) show that self-interested 
managers retain and invest cash windfalls inefficiently and Harford (1999) finds evidence that 
managers waste excess cash on poor acquisitions. Both Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and 
Harford et al. (2008) find that entrenched managers deplete excess cash, but they differ on 
whether this dissipation dampens firms’ operating performance. Attributing the mixed evidence 
in the US to the lack of insufficient variation in the agency conflict across firms, several authors 
take the issue to the international setting. For example, Dittmar et al. (2003) examine the relation 
between shareholder rights and cash holdings and document a negative link while Kalcheva and 
Lins (2007) investigate both country-level and firm-level agency conflict and cash holdings and 
find that the quality of external investor protection per se has no significant bearing on cash 
holdings. Both of these studies’ conclusions are based on one-year samples which may be a 
factor behind the contradictory results. These findings contrast with the US evidence 
documented by Harford et al. (2008) that as firm-level shareholder rights increase, cash reserves 
increase. Another line of literature examining the valuation effect of cash demonstrates that the 
market discount the value of cash when investors are not well protected (Kalcheva and Lins 
(2007) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006)). These studies, while instructive, do not provide the direct 
channel through which cash reserves and investor protection together impinge on firm value. 
More importantly, Spamann (2009) finds coding errors in the original anti-director rights 
index from La Porta et al. (1998), which is utilized by these earlier studies. He reports that 
several empirical results derived with the original anti-director rights index do not hold with 
corrected values. As such, whether the evidence from previous small sample studies is 
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generalizable and whether those results hold using the rectified index is an important empirical 
question. These issues leave the question of how agency conflict affects firms’ cash policy 
largely unanswered. In this study, I revisit the connection between investor protection and the 
cash level using a large sample of cross-sectional and time-series micro-level data spanning 13 
years and new shareholder rights indices for 41 countries. I also explicitly address the valuation 
channel by examining the effect of investor protection on the use of excess cash and the resulting 
effect on operating performance. As far as I know, I am the first to investigate the deployment of 
excess cash in the international setting. Using 115,945 firm-year observations of 18,192 firms 
from 41 countries for the period 1996-2008 and controlling for various firm-level characteristics 
and country-level proxies for external financing opportunities, I report novel evidence that firms 
in countries with weaker corporate governance do not hold more cash than firms operating in 
countries with stronger governance regimes. These findings are in stark contrast to previous 
evidence (Dittmar et al. (2003)) that controlling shareholders invest more in liquid assets when 
external governance constraints are weak. 
Firms operating in weak legal structures are reluctant to disburse cash to shareholders (LLSV 
(2000a)). To explore why firms in countries with weak legal systems do not hold higher levels of 
cash, I investigate the dissipation of excess cash and the investment behavior of my sample 
firms. My analysis reveals that firms in countries where investors are not well protected dissipate 
more of their excess cash. Furthermore, I find that firms are prone to overinvest when they have 
positive excess cash, and that this effect is magnified in countries with poor external corporate 
governance.  
The greater sensitivity of investment to internal funds in countries with weak legal systems 
may be attributable to under-developed financial markets in these countries (Love (2003)) rather 
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than a reflection of agency conflicts in the form of overinvestment incentives (Jensen (1986)). To 
distinguish between the agency costs explanation and the financing constraint explanation for my 
findings, I investigate whether the use of cash affects firms’ operating performance. Ultimately, 
investment decisions should impact firm profitability whether higher levels of investment are 
detrimental (due to overinvestment) or beneficial (as firms compensate for shallow and under-
developed markets). My analysis indicates that excessive cash holdings are negatively related to 
firms’ profitability in countries where shareholder rights are weak. Strong external governance 
can partially reverse the negative effect of excess cash on firms’ operating performance. The 
results support the notion that greater sensitivity of investments to excess cash for firms in 
countries with weak legal structures reflects managerial overinvestment behavior, rather than 
shallow capital markets. The findings lead us to conclude that the inefficient use of excess cash 
impedes firms’ performance, giving rise to legitimate cause for concern on the part of outside 
shareholders about large cash reserves. The overall evidence is generally consistent with the 
managerial empire building hypothesis. 
My cross-country evidence on the relation between corporate governance and the level of 
cash is more in line with findings for the US documented by Harford et al. (2008) who show that 
as shareholder rights increase, cash balances increase. They interpret their findings as the 
consequences of entrenched managers’ quick dissipation of cash to avoid being targeted by 
empowered shareholders for holding too much unused cash. In contrast, my findings suggest that 
the driving force behind the dissipation of cash is the unconstrained overinvestment incentive 
associated with weak external governance mechanisms. My study in this chapter contributes to 
the literature in two important ways. First, I add to the research on corporate cash holdings by 
providing an overall picture of how agency conflict comes into play in corporate cash policies. 
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Prior research attempts to explore this issue from generally three different angles: the association 
between corporate governance and cash level, the relation between corporate governance and 
real consequences of cash positions, and the link between corporate governance and the value of 
cash. In this paper, I document new evidence that poor investor protection is not actually 
associated with high cash holdings as previously thought. This new finding reconciles the 
previously contradictory evidence between international and US studies. In addition, by using a 
large sample spanning 13 years and taking advantage of considerable variation in the quality of 
external corporate governance, I present evidence that the combination of excess cash and poor 
corporate governance does not bode well for shareholders. Furthermore, my study provides 
insights into how governance mechanisms affect the value of cash, revealing that the previously 
documented value loss of liquid assets in weaker governance countries can be attributed to 
inefficient use of excess cash and misallocation of capital.  
Second, my study contributes to the research relating country-level corporate governance to 
firm value. Previous research establishes that poor corporate governance causes a significant 
discount in firm value (Claessens et al. (2002) and La Porta et al. (2002)). The earlier literature 
attributes this value loss primarily to outright diversion of assets by controlling shareholders (La 
Porta et al. (2002), and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)). Recent literature (Albuquerue and Wang 
(2008)) argues that controlling shareholders under weak external constraints have stronger 
incentives to overinvest because they are able to derive greater private benefits in larger firms, 
and that distorted investments reduce firm value. I provide empirical evidence in support of this 
conjecture by showing that the confluence of weaker governance and excess cash result in 
profligate spending on inefficient investments. My findings suggest that non-value-maximizing 
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overinvestment is an agency issue not only in rich common law countries (La Porta, et al. 
(2000b)), but also in countries with weaker legal systems. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, I develop my hypotheses. I present 
sample construction and variable measurements in section 2.3. In section 2.4, I examine the 
relation between external governance structures and cash holdings. I then proceed to examine the 
link between corporate governance, dissipation of excess cash and investments in section 2.5. I 
explore whether the use of excess cash hinders firms’ profitability in section 2.6, and in section 
2.7 I conclude.  
2.2. Hypothesis development 
One of the earliest rationales for maintaining cash reserves is that it affords the firm financial 
slack that diminishes transaction costs of raising funds by issuing debt or equity, selling assets or 
cutting dividends. More importantly, firms may hold cash reserves to avoid forgoing future 
investment opportunities when external financing is prohibitively costly. If managers serve the 
best interests’ of shareholders, they will optimize cash holdings by balancing the marginal costs 
of investing in liquid assets against the marginal costs of being short of funds. In this framework, 
cash balances in firms under weaker corporate governance should be indistinguishable from 
those of firms under stronger governance structures.  I refer to this as the Irrelevance Hypothesis. 
Self-interested managers have incentives to increase the amount of assets under their control 
which suggests that cash is retained or invested inefficiently rather than disbursed to 
shareholders. Consistent with this argument, La Porta et al. (2000a) cross-country analysis 
provides evidence that weaker external governance is associated with lower dividend payouts. 
The implication of this finding is that firms under weaker governance structures retain a greater 
portion of their earnings. Whether these large retained earnings ultimately translate into high 
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levels of cash reserves depends on the tradeoff between convenience and empire-building 
preferences of controlling shareholders. Since cash policy is not simply the flip side of dividend 
policy, it cannot be inferred from La Porta et al.’s (2000a) findings that cash level is higher in 
countries with weaker shareholder rights. 
On the one hand, large cash reserves provide controlling shareholders with the convenience 
and freedom from scrutiny by the capital market (Easterbrook (1984)). In addition, controlling 
shareholders may hold on to cash to reduce the likelihood of financial distress and possible loss 
of control. Insider shareholders may also hoard cash to facilitate the diversion of liquid assets 
into private benefits and the consumption of perquisites (La Porta et al. (2002)). If controlling 
shareholders put greater value on the convenience of cash reserves, they are more likely to 
stockpile cash when the constraints imposed by the external governance are weak. In this case, I 
should observe a higher cash level in firms from countries where investors are not well protected. 
Dittmar et al. (2003) find evidence consistent with this convenience prediction.  
Alternatively, agency cost theory argues that managers have excessive taste for running large 
firms and that empire-building preferences will cause managers to spend available funds and 
misallocate resources through inefficient investments (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen 
(1986)).
19
 This leads to the prediction that investments are increasing in internal resources—that 
is, excess cash will tempt firms to overinvest. Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) establish that the 
extent of entrenchment at firm level is associated with higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Given that the private benefits of control are higher under weaker shareholder rights, controlling 
shareholders may have stronger incentive to distort investments to pursue their self-interests. If 
                                                 
19 One of the channels that the investment in real assets expands the scope and asset base of the firm is through 
the ―asset multiplier.‖ When real assets increase, collateral is augmented, facilitating external financing. This in turn 
allows the firm to make more investments.  
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these arguments are borne out, I expect the positive link between excess cash and investments to 
be amplified in countries with weaker claimant rights—higher tendency to deplete cash more 
quickly by spending it on inefficient investments. As a result, if managers’ first-order preference 
is empire building, I should observe that firms under poor governance mechanisms do not hold 
higher levels of cash. 
In sum, if firms’ cash decisions are only based on the economic incentives, there should be 
no connection between the proxies for agency conflict and the level of cash after controlling for 
transaction costs and precautionary motive of cash holdings. Conversely, if agency conflict plays 
a role in cash policy, I should observe a significant influence of governance metrics on cash 
level. A negative link between agency conflict and cash level implies a preference for empire 
building while a positive connection reflects that managers favor holding cash for convenience 
and flexibility. 
2.3. Sample and data 
2.3.1. Sample construction 
I collect financial data from Worldscope database for all firms between 1985 and 2008 for 49 
countries. Then I apply the following screening criteria. I exclude firms that have missing 
information on the method of reporting long-term investments in which they have interest in 
excess of 50% and firms that do not consolidate their major subsidiaries. I also require 
observations to have non-missing values on the following variables: total assets, sales, book 
value of equity, cash and marketable securities, capital expenditures, working capital, dividends, 
long term debt, cash flow and market capitalization. To avoid measurement errors, observations 
with negative values on total assets, sales, book value of equity, cash and marketable securities 
are deleted. I also exclude financial services and utilities firms, where cash policies are 
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influenced by statutory capital requirements and other government regulations. To be included in 
the analysis, information on external governance indices and capital market development must 
also be available.  
Given the concern that the large representation of US observations may bias the overall 
results, I exclude US firms from my sample.
20
 I choose 1996 as the start year because firm 
coverage in Worldscope before 1985 is sparse and I need 10 years data to estimate industry cash 
flow volatility. After imposing the above sample requirements, I am left with 115,945 firm-year 
observations for 18,192 firms from 41 countries. The subsequent various analyses may have 
different observations due to missing values of certain variables. 
2.3.2. Cash holdings and other firm specific variables 
In this section, I define the variables that I use to measure the level of cash and the 
determinants of cash holdings. I use the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets as 
my measure of cash. While cash scaled by net assets (total assets less cash and marketable 
securities) or cash scaled by sales can be used to measure cash, I find extreme outliers in these 
two alternative measures. Nonetheless, I use these two measures to serve as robustness checks. 
To proxy for investment opportunities, I use market-to-book ratio (MTB) estimated as (book 
value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity) scaled by total assets.  I use 
R&D expenses to sales (RD) to proxy for information asymmetry and costs of financial distress. 
This variable takes a value of zero for firms with missing R&D expense information. I measure 
firm size as the logarithm of the book value of total assets, which is stated in US dollars in 2008 
prices for all countries. Using the procedure employed by prior research, I calculate cash flow 
                                                 
20 The US has total firm-year observations of 52,264 during my sample period, accounting for 45% of total 
observations for all other countries. Another rationale for excluding US firms is the fact that the market for corporate 
control in the US is strongest among all countries and such a powerful disciplinary mechanism can have a 
significant impact on managerial behavior regarding cash policy. 
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volatility (CFVOL) as the median standard deviation of industry cash flows of the previous ten 
years.
21  
 
I measure cash flow as earnings after interest, taxes and common dividends but before 
depreciation scaled by book value of total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is calculated as the 
ratio of current assets less current liabilities less cash and marketable securities to total assets. I 
use a dummy variable (DIV) that takes a value of one if the firm has a positive dividend payout 
and zero otherwise. Leverage is computed as long term debt plus short term debt divided by total 
assets. I scale capital expenditures by total assets (CAPEX) to represent the firm’s investment 
needs. To alleviate the effect of outliers, I winsorize firm-level financial data at the 1 percent in 
both tails of each variable.  The descriptive statistics for firm and country level data for each 
country in my sample are presented in Appendix A. 
2.3.3. Governance metrics and other country-level variables 
I gauge the quality of external corporate governance by both the legal rights granted to 
minority shareholders by law and the enforcement of these rights. Specifically, I measure the 
rights granted to minority shareholders with the corrected anti-director rights index (C-ADRI) 
from Spamann (2009) and the revised anti-director rights index (R-ADRI) developed by Djankov 
et al. (2008). I obtain the rule of law index (RuLaw) and expropriation risk index (Exprop) from 
La Porta et al. (1998). The corrected anti-director rights index corrects the coding errors and 
ambiguities of the original anti-director rights index. Both corrected and revised indices take 
values from 0 to 6, with 6 representing the highest legal protection offered to minority 
                                                 
21 I rely on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) for industry classification which is adopted by stock 
exchanges representing over 65% of world’s market capitalization. ICB has a four-tiered structure: 10 industries, 19 
supersectors, 41 sectors and 114 subsectors. I use supersectors to define 13 broad industries (excluding utilities and 
financial services).    
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investors.
22
 The rule of law and expropriation risk indices gauge the quality of law enforcement 
where the former index assesses the overall quality and tradition of law and order in a country 
while the expropriation risk index measures the risk of outright confiscation or forced 
nationalization by the government, generally reflecting the government’s stance toward business. 
In addition to using the level of various indices of investor protection, I classify countries 
according to the median of various indices and employ these dummy variables in some 
estimations.  
 Following Pinkowitz et al. (2006), I utilize three measures of external financing 
opportunities that reflect equity, bond and private credit market developments. Equity and bond 
market development are measured by equity market capitalization (MktSize) and bond market 
capitalization (BonSize), respectively, while private credit market development (CrdSize) is 
measured by domestic credit provided by the banking sector. All three variables are scaled by 
gross domestic product (GDP). I obtain annual information on these variables from World 
Development Indicators maintained by the World Bank. 
2.3.4. Measuring excess cash 
I define excess cash as the cash beyond the normal level, where normal cash reflects the 
genuine motives to hold cash to meet operational and investment needs. I use three approaches to 
obtain the predicted normal cash and excess cash. First, I estimate a cash level regression for 
each country independently and then take the average of each coefficient. I then apply each 
coefficient to its corresponding variable to obtain the predicted normal cash and compute excess 
cash as the difference between actual cash and the predicted normal cash. I refer to excess cash 
                                                 
22 Both indices are based on six shareholder rights: (1) whether the law allows shareholders to vote by mail, (2) 
whether shares have to be deposited prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) whether the law allows 
cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors, (4) whether an oppressed 
minorities’ mechanism is in place, (5) whether shareholders have pre-emptive rights, and (6) whether the minimum 
capital to call for an extraordinary meeting is greater than 10%.  
69 
 
   
estimated from this approach as ExCash(Avg). In the second approach, I pool together all 
countries’ data, estimate a cash level regression each year, and then take the average of the 
parameter estimates from the annual regressions (Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach). Excess cash 
derived from this method is called ExCash(F-M). Third, I use random effect approach to estimate 
a cash level regression for pooled data of all countries and obtain the parameter estimates and 
excess cash, referred to as ExCash(Ran). ExCash(Avg) is utilized throughout the paper whereas 
the other two measures are for robustness checks. Consistent with Fresard and Salva (2009), I 
find that the correlation between these different measures of excess cash is high. Detailed 
information on the estimation of excess cash is presented in Appendix B. 
2.4. Corporate governance and corporate cash holdings 
2.4.1. Multivariate analysis of cash level 
      In this section, I empirically examine the connection between country-level investor 
protection metrics and cash holdings to test the hypotheses proposed earlier. If mangers serve the 
best interests of shareholders and make cash decisions based on economic motives, the corporate 
governance metrics should have no bearing on cash policy. Alternatively, if managers are 
motivated by self-interest and they prefer the convenience of cash reserves, the agency conflict 
would manifest itself through higher cash balances in economies with weak investor protection. 
However, if empire building is the modus operandi of managers, they would dissipate cash 
quickly by overinvesting when the constraints from external governance are weak, in which case 
I would observe a lower cash level in countries with weaker investor protections.  
In my regression specifications, I use cash and marketable securities to total assets as the 
dependent variable and each of the four governance metrics are added as independent variables 
one at a time. A positive sign on a governance metric variable signifies a lower cash level when 
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shareholder rights are weaker. I control for firm characteristics by including future growth 
opportunities, information asymmetry, firm size, cash flow, volatility of cash flows, substitutes 
for cash, and ability to access the external markets. Specifically, firm-level variables employed 
are industry cash flow volatility, logarithm of real firm size in 2008 US dollar (LSIZE), market-
to-book ratio, leverage, cash flow to assets, net working capital to assets, capital expenditure to 
assets, R&D expenses to sales and a dividend dummy indicating the dividend status of the firm. 
At the country-level, I control for external financing opportunities by including three variables 
which proxy for equity market development, bond market development and private credit market 
development. In addition, I control for differences in cash level that stems from the business 
cycle by including year fixed effects. I employ a country random effects specification to account 
for the interdependence between firms within a country.  
The first four models in Table 2.1 incorporate firm-level control variables and each of four 
shareholder rights indices. In Models 5-8, I augment the basic model by adding country-level 
control variables for external financing opportunities to account for the possibility that firms hold 
large cash balances to counter external financing constraints. In Models 9 and 10, I include both 
the quality of shareholder rights and the enforcement of these rights in one model to investigate 
whether these two dimensions of external governance have independent effects on the decision 
of how much cash to hold.  
I find that the firm-level variables in all models have significant coefficients with the 
predicted signs. In particular, industry cash flow volatility, not included in the previous studies 
on international cash holdings, has a positive and significant impact on cash policy in all 
specifications, consistent with the argument that firms hold cash to hedge against future cash 
flow  shortfalls. Further,  the  coefficients on all three proxies for capital market development are 
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positive and significant, indicating that the accessibility to external funds enhances cash 
holdings. This finding is not consistent with the argument that firms hold more cash because they 
have limited external financing opportunities; instead, it supports the agency conflict explanation 
that firms hold more cash when they have opportunities to do so. 
With regard to the variables of my main interest, I find in Models 1 and 5 a significantly 
positive link between cash holdings and R-ADRI, indicating a lower cash level at firms in 
countries with weaker shareholder rights. In Models 2 and 6, the coefficients on C-ADRI are 
insignificant, consistent with the findings by Kalcheva and Lins (2007). The coefficients on the 
enforcement variables in Models 3, 4, 7 and 8 are positive and significant. Further, the 
coefficients on both R-ADRI and enforcement variables are positive and significant in Models 9 
and 10, indicating independent effect of protective laws and the degree of their enforcement on 
cash. Taken together, the evidence from these models indicates a strong positive link between the 
quality of external governance and the level of cash, which contrasts with the evidence by 
Dittmar et al. (2003) that as shareholder rights increase, the cash reserves decrease.  
2.4.2. Robustness checks 
To give additional support to the results, I undertake a battery of robustness checks and 
present my findings in Table 2.2. In all models, I include the same firm-level variables as in 
Table 1. The coefficients on these variables still have the predicted signs but are not reported in 
Table 2 for brevity. In Model 1, I use R-ADRI and rule of law dummies instead of the level of 
these two variables. Consistent with the findings in the above sections, the coefficients on both 
variables are positive and significant.  
Cross-country studies are often criticized for the possible omission of important institutional 
features. To  ease  the  concern  of  potential  omitted variable biases, I conduct four additional 
74 
 
   
 
 
75 
 
   
 
76 
 
   
 
tests by considering creditor protection, political rights, dividend tax preferences, and accounting 
quality. First, I augment the basic model from Table 2.1 by adding the creditor rights index 
compiled by La Porta et al. (1998) to investigate whether the shareholder rights capture the effect 
of creditor protection.
23
 On the one hand, because high creditor protection is associated with 
large private credit markets and low costs of debt financing, higher creditor protection predicts 
lower cash reserves  (Djankov et al. (2007) and Bae and Goyal (2009)). One the other hand, high 
creditor rights impose expensive financial distress costs on management and controlling 
shareholders, allowing high liquidity holdings to serve as insurance against future default. 
Consistent with the latter notion, the coefficient on creditor rights index in Model 2 indicates a 
positive and significant link between creditor rights and cash level.  
Previous research documents that agency conflicts between debt and equity claimants affect 
firms’ capital structure choice (Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Sufi (2007)), the investment 
decision (Nini et al. (2007)), and dividend policies (Brockman and Unlu (2009)). My findings 
indicate that the agency costs of debt also have bearing on corporate liquidity policies. More 
importantly, after controlling for creditor rights, the coefficients on R-ADRI and rule of law 
index are still significantly positive, confirming the effect of shareholder rights and their 
enforcement on cash level.  
Second, in Model 3 I consider the effect of the political constraint index, obtained from 
Henisz (2005), on cash holdings. Qi et al. (2010) show that greater political rights are associated 
with lower costs of debt financing. While I do not find political rights to have any bearing on the 
cash decision, the inclusion of this variable does not change my inferences for shareholder rights. 
                                                 
23 The index, which ranges from 0 to 4, is comprised of four creditor rights variables. These four variables 
include whether the reorganization procedure imposes an automatic stay on the assets, whether secured creditors are 
paid first, whether creditor consent is needed to file for reorganization, and whether management can stay during 
reorganization. The higher the number on this index, the greater is the creditors’ power in case of default. 
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Third, I include dividend tax preferences (obtained from La Porta et al. (2000a)) in Model 4 to 
account for the possible influence of disadvantageous dividend taxes on the decisions to hold 
cash. This variable measures the advantage of dividends over capital gains after accounting for 
taxes. The coefficient on dividend tax preference is not significant; however, the inclusion of this 
variable does not affect the relevance of both R-ADRI and rule of law index on cash level. And 
lastly, I take the quality of accounting information into consideration since this factor has been 
found to be associated with the cost of capital (Lambert et al. (2007)). The coefficient on this 
variable in Model 5 is negative and significant, consistent with the notion that high accounting 
quality reduces the need to hold large internal funds. The coefficient on R-ADRI remains 
unchanged.  
Further, I employ a different estimation technique. To account for the cross-sectional 
clusters, I use Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach to re-estimate Model 1 and compute t-statistics 
for the regression coefficients using the Newey and West (1987) procedure that is robust to 
autocorrelation out to three lags. Model 6 indicates that the coefficient on R-ADRI (0.018) is 
significantly positive. Using cross-country data for 1998, Dittmar et al. (2003) draw the 
conclusion that firms under weaker investor protections have a tendency to build more cash 
reserves than their counterparts in countries with stronger shareholder rights. I replicate their 
analysis using only 1998 data from my sample in Model 7. The coefficient on C-ADRI is 
negative, consistent with Dittmar et al.’s finding, but insignificant in my sample.24 This result is 
also consistent with Kalcheva and Lins (2007), who document a negative but insignificant 
coefficient on shareholder rights using data for 1996.   
                                                 
24 The difference may be attributable to different sources of data, model specification, and governance metrics 
(they use original anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. (1998)).  
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In Models 8 through 10, I address the sample selection issues. Japan and UK have the largest 
representations in my sample and the East Asia had experienced the currency crisis during my 
sample period. To address concerns that these events may drive my findings, I create three 
subsamples by first excluding UK, and then both Japan and UK, and finally Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand from the sample, and then redo the basic analysis. For these 
subsamples, the results in Models 8, 9 and 10 remain unchanged with the R-ADRI variable 
positive and statistically significant.  
I also conduct additional tests using alternative measures of both dependent and independent 
variables. I use the natural logarithm of cash and marketable securities to total assets, cash ratio 
scaled by net assets, cash ratio scaled by sales and industry-adjusted cash ratio as dependent 
variables and obtain quantitatively similar findings. I also use market-value-weighted, book-
value-weighted and mean industry cash flow volatility as alternative measures of cash flow risk, 
and the inferences remain unaltered.
25
 
Collectively, this first set of results provide evidence that firms under weaker external 
governance do not hold higher levels of cash, when governance measure reflects the granting of 
shareholder rights. Moreover, when governance metric is the quality of the enforcement of these 
rights, firms in poorer governance countries actually hold lower levels of cash. My evidence so 
far does not support the irrelevance and convenience hypotheses. However, to conclude whether 
my findings are consistent with the empire-building hypothesis, I need to explicitly investigate 
whether firms under weaker external governance have excessive spending, especially on 
investments, when they hold excess cash.       
 
                                                 
25 If I include the US in the sample and replicate the regression analysis of Model 5 in Table 1, the coefficient on 
revised anti-director rights index is still positive and significant at 10% level.  
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2.5. Corporate governance, dissipation of excess cash and investment 
To provide direct evidence on the role of empire building hypothesis on cash, I investigate 
how external governance affects the use of cash. Specifically, I explore whether firms form 
countries with weaker governance mechanisms spend more excess cash than firms from stronger 
investor protections. Then, I analyze the relation between excessive cash holdings, governance 
metrics, and firms’ investments. 
2.5.1. Corporate governance and dissipation of excess cash 
To investigate how shareholder rights affect how much cash firms dissipate, I depict how 
much of excess cash remains in each of five years following the year with positive excess cash. 
In particular, I treat the year with positive excess cash as year zero (t=0), and calculate the 
median of the ratio of value of excess cash from each of year t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4, and t+5 to year 
0. In unreported results, I find that firms dissipate their excess cash more quickly when country-
level shareholder rights are not well defined. For example, in the first year following the year 
with positive excess cash, firms from countries with poor investor protection use between 25%-
30% of their excess cash while firms from countries with strong investor protections only 
dissipate 5% of excess cash. This finding for high shareholder rights countries is consistent with 
the evidence for the US documented by Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar et al. (2007). At the end 
of year five, firms under weak investor protections dissipate 70%-75% of their excess cash while 
their counterparts from strong shareholder rights countries use 60%-65% of excess cash.    
To further characterize the dissipation behavior of firms from different governance regimes, I 
conduct regression analysis for a subsample of firms with positive excess cash at year t where the 
dependent variable is the change in excess cash from year t to t+1 (excess cash at year t+1 minus  
excess   cash  at  year  t ).   The  independent  variables   include   governance   metrics  and   the  
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Table 2.3 Investor protection and dissipation of cash 
 
      The table reports the regression results testing the relation between the quality of investor protection 
and the dissipation of cash using a subsample of firms with positive excess cash at year t. The dependent 
variable is the future change in excess cash estimated as excess cash at year t+1 minus the value at year t. 
In Models 1-4, the measure of excess cash, ExCash(Avg), is obtained through averaging the coefficients 
from regressions for each country. In Model 5, the measure of excess cash is obtained through estimating 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression for the pooled data for all countries (ExCash(F-M)). In Model 6, the 
measure of excess cash is obtained through the random effects regression for the pooled data 
(ExCash(Ran)). Industry average change in excess cash is estimated as median value of industry change in 
excess cash on a yearly basis. The governance metrics employed are as described in Table 1. I classify 
sample countries based on the median value of each governance metrics, and the governance dummy 
equals to 1 if a country’s value is above the median value. All regression models include year fixed effects. 
t-statistics based on standard errors robust to clustering by firms are reported in parenthesis. a, b, c denote 
statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
        
     ExCash ExCash 
 ExCash (Avg) (F-M) (Ran) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.035a -0.033a -0.026a -0.026a 0.010a -0.019a 
 (-21.43) (-21.45) (-16.49) (-16.02) (3.60) (-8.43) 
Industry Average Change in Excess Cash 1.090a 1.072a 1.151a 1.151a 0.057 0.995a 
 (7.90) (7.77) (8.27) (8.27) (0.47) (9.47) 
R-ADRI (dummy) 0.016a      
 (14.17)      
C-ADRI (dummy)  0.019a     
  (21.26)     
Exprop (dummy)   0.002c    
   (1.64)    
RuLaw (dummy)    0.002c   
    (1.70)   
R-ADRI (level)     0.001c 0.001a 
     (1.87) (2.99) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.010 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.005 
N 39,865 39,865 39,865 39,865 43,633 54,340 
 
contemporaneous industry average change in excess cash to control for varying industry cash 
needs due to growth opportunities and business risks. I also control for time trends by including 
year dummies. I am interested in the coefficients of the various governance metrics—a positive 
sign implies less dissipation of cash from year t to year t+1 in better governance regimes. For 
each governance metric, I estimate one regression to distinguish between high and low investor 
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protection and present the results in Models 1 through 4 in Table 1.3. In Models 5 and 6, I re-
estimate Model 1 using two alternative measures of excess cash.  
Consistent with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), my results show that industry average 
change in excess cash has significant explanatory power for the change in excess cash at firm 
level in all models. More importantly, the coefficients on all governance metrics in all 
specifications are positive and significant, indicating that firms under strong investor protection 
spend less cash than firms under weak shareholder rights. Further, my inferences remain the 
same when I measure excess cash using the average of coefficients from regressions for each 
country independently or when using Fama-Macbeth approach or random effects for pooled data 
of all countries.  
2.5.2. Corporate governance, excess cash and investment 
Firms may deploy excess cash to capital expenditures, R&D expenses, acquisitions, paying 
down debt or dividend payments. Clearly, the dissipation of cash does not automatically translate 
into wasteful use of resources. The use of excess cash can result in reduced firm value through 
overpaying for acquisitions, or through inefficient investments, thereby reducing ongoing 
operating performance. Given that I am interested in whether excessive cash holdings impact 
firms’ operating performance, I focus my analysis in this section on how external governance 
and excess cash together affect firms’ total investments, defined as the sum of capital 
expenditures and R&D expenses scaled by total assets.
26
 
To do this, I estimate a series of regressions for the subsample of firms with positive excess 
cash by relating the future change in total investments to excess cash. To control for industry 
effect,  I  adjust  the  total  investments  by  global  industry  median  value  on  a  yearly  basis.  
                                                 
26 I do not examine capital expenditures and R&D expenses separately because the accounting rules to expense 
or capitalize capital expenditures and R&D expenses varies across countries (Flower and Ebbers (2002)).  
82 
 
   
Table 2.4 Investor protection and investments 
 
       This table analyzes the investment behavior of firms from different governance countries using a sample of firms 
with positive excess cash at year t-1. The dependent variable is the change in industry-adjusted total investment 
estimated as sum of capital expenditures and R&D expenses scaled by total assets. I adjust total investment by global 
industry value estimated as the median of country median each year. Additional country-level control variable included 
here is lending rate. I classify sample countries based on median value of each governance metrics, and the governance 
dummy equals 1 if a country’s value is above the median. In Model 7, all the variables except for governance dummy 
are included as differences. In Models 1-4 and 7, the measure of excess cash is obtained through averaging the 
coefficients from regressions for each country (ExCash(Avg)). In Model 5, excess cash is obtained through estimating 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression for pooled data for all countries (ExCash(F-M)). In Model 6, excess cash is obtained 
from random effects regression for pooled data (ExCash(Ran)). All models include year fixed effects and are estimated 
using country random effect. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. a, b, c denote statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.  
                
     
ExCash ExCash Change in 
 
ExCash (Avg.) (F-M) (Ran) Variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0.009a -0.008b -0.008a -0.007b -0.010a -0.008a -0.006a 
 
(-3.22) (-2.71) (-2.86) (-2.62) (-3.74) (-3.08) (-4.44) 
NWC / Assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004a 0.004a -0.010a 
 
(0.50) (0.60) (0.41) (0.39) (2.62) (2.78) (-2.93) 
Leverage -0.017a -0.018a -0.017a -0.017a -0.019a -0.018a 0.017a 
 
(-11.26) (-11.33) (-11.21) (-11.23) (-14.32) (-14.34) (4.20) 
LSIZE 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a -0.002b 
 
(5.60) (5.49) (5.41) (5.31) (7.30) (6.93) (-2.44) 
Sales Growth 0.464 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.63) (0.72) (0.76) (0.70) (0.99) (1.22) (0.83) 
CrdSize -0.030a -0.032a -0.020c -0.017 -0.049a -0.055a -0.113a 
 
(-2.60) (-2.71) (-1.80) (-1.60) (-4.22) (-4.86) (-3.97) 
BonSize -0.082 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.202 
 
(-0.02) (-0.16) (-0.36) (0.29) (0.89) (0.93) (0.03) 
MktSize -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 0.008 
 
(-0.87) (-0.54) (-0.68) (-0.62) (-0.29) (-0.86) (1.09) 
Lending Rate -0.096 -0.111 -0.053 -0.054 -0.270a -0.299a -0.001a 
 
(-1.38) (-1.56) (-0.79) (-0.84) (-3.66) (-4.09) (-3.38) 
ChgExCash 
      
-0.025a 
       
(-7.74) 
ExCasht-1 0.043
a 0.036a 0.035a 0.029a 0.046a 0.045a 0.040a 
 
(11.07) (12.86) (10.57) (8.45) (12.30) (12.80) (10.27) 
R-ADRI 0.005a 
   
0.007a 0.007a 0.003b 
 
(3.09) 
   
(3.25) (3.33) (2.23) 
R-ADRI * ExCasht-1 -0.022
a 
   
-0.024a -0.023a -0.018a 
 
(-4.81) 
   
(-5.37) (-5.42) (-3.90) 
C-ADRI 
 
0.008a 
     
  
(3.58) 
     C-ADRI * ExCasht-1 
 
-0.028a 
     
  
(-5.50) 
     Exprop 
  
0.001 
    
   
(0.76) 
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Exprop * ExCasht-1 
  
-0.013a 
    
   
(-2.94) 
    RuLaw 
   
-0.002 
   
    
(-1.17) 
   RuLaw * ExCasht-1 
   
-0.001 
   
    
(-0.14) 
   Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 
N 35,997 35,997 35,997 35,997 45,227 48,337 33,684 
 
Specifically, I regress future change in industry-adjusted total investments (the value at year t+1 
minus that at year t) on excess cash holdings at year t. For firm-level control variables, I include 
net working capital to total assets, logarithm of real total asset in 2008 US dollars, leverage, and 
sales growth. Given that investment decisions are related to the availability of funds and 
borrowing costs, I include in the regression specification the equity, bond and private credit 
market development variables as well as the lending rate. All the regressions include year 
dummies to control for macroeconomic factors and the business cycle. Similar to the previous 
analysis, I present one regression for each of the four governance metrics in Models 1 through 4 
as well as for each of the two alternative measures of excess cash in Models 5 and 6 in Table 2.4. 
In model 7, I include all variables except for governance dummy as differences to remove the 
effect of all firm-level time-invariant unobserved factors on the investments. The coefficients of 
interest are those for excess cash at year t and the interaction of excess cash with dummy 
governance metrics (high shareholder rights take a value of 1). A positive sign on excess cash 
signifies more investments in the presence of excess cash, while a positive sign on the interaction 
terms imply that the overinvestment is enhanced in countries where investors are better 
protected.   
Generally I find a negative link between the proxies for financial market development and 
firms’ investments in Table 2.4, consistent with previous evidence that financially developed 
countries do not invest at a higher level (Beek et al. (2000), and Wurgler (2000)). The negative 
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sign on lending rate indicates that firms invest less when the financing costs are high. The point 
estimates on lagged excess cash are positive and significant in all models, indicating that excess 
cash holdings induce firms to invest more when the external constraints are weak. In terms of 
economic significance, a one-standard deviation increase in excess cash leads to 0.35%-0.54% 
increase in investments in firms operating in countries with weaker shareholder rights than their 
industry peers. With a mean sample industry-adjusted total investment of 2.35%, this 
corresponds to an economically significant 15%-23% increase in total investments on average.  
The significant negative coefficients on the interaction terms between excess cash and 
shareholder rights metrics show that the propensity to overinvest when excess cash is available is 
reduced when country-level investor protection is strong. However, an F-test on the sum of 
coefficients on excess cash and the interaction terms suggests that the firms in countries with 
strong shareholder rights also display overinvestment proclivity when excess cash is at hand, but 
with much smaller magnitudes.
27
  
2.6. Corporate governance, dissipation of excess cash and firm performance 
2.6.1. Corporate governance, dissipation of excess cash and firm profitability 
Given the evidence so far, I cannot conclude that the overspending behavior is due to agency 
conflicts. Love (2003) documents that investments are highly sensitive to the availability of 
internal funds when the financial markets are relatively under-developed. Since countries with 
weaker external governance are more likely to have poorly developed capital markets, this may 
prompt  firms  to  invest  more  when they have excess internal funds. To distinguish between the  
 
                                                 
27 I examine the relation between governance metrics, excess cash and dividend policy and find no significant 
difference in change in dividend policy across high and low investor protection countries when firms hold excess 
cash. One possible explanation is that share repurchases have become an increasingly important payout method and 
have served as a substitute for dividend payout in recent years in wealthy common law countries. However, share 
repurchases are viewed as illegal and are heavily taxed in some civil law countries (La Porta et al. (2000a)). Thus, 
the use of cash dividend payout may bias against finding a difference between the two regimes.  
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Table 2.5 Investor protection, dissipation of excess cash and operating performance 
 
This table analyzes the relation between use of excess cash, operating performance and the quality of 
investor protections for firms with positive excess cash at year t-1. The dependent variable is industry-
adjusted operating performance (ROA) estimated as earnings before interests and depreciation scaled by 
total assets less global industry value (median of country medians each year). The firm-level control 
variables are lagged industry adjusted ROA LSIZE, asset structure (property, plant and equipment/total 
assets) and sales growth. For interaction terms, the governance metric is a dummy equaling 1 if a country’s 
governance value is above the median while the dissipation of excess cash (ChgExCash) is measured as 
ExCash(Avg)t-1 minus ExCash(Avg)t . All models include year fixed effects and are estimated using country 
random effect. t-statistics are in parenthesis. a, b, c denote statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
          
 
Model Model Model Model 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.054a -0.054a -0.057a -0.058a 
 
(-8.10) (-8.37) (-8.63) (-8.08) 
Industry Adj. ROAt-1 0.770a 0.770
a 0.771a 0.770a 
 
(215.48) (215.38) (215.73) (215.51) 
LSIZE 0.005a 0.005a 0.005a 0.005a 
 
(14.09) (14.06) (14.10) (14.10) 
PPE / Assets 0.010a 0.010a 0.010a 0.010a 
 
(2.99) (3.04) (2.90) (3.06) 
Sales Growth 0.066a 0.066a 0.066a 0.066a 
 
(44.77) (44.91) (44.82) (44.82) 
CrdSize -0.023 -0.028 -0.028 -0.035 
 
(-0.77) (-0.97) (-0.93) (-1.16) 
BonSize -0.016b -0.015b -0.019b -0.020a 
 
(-2.19) (-2.14) (-2.57) (-2.62) 
MktSize -0.027 -0.025 -0.029c -0.030c 
 
(-1.57) (-1.53) (-1.73) (-1.74) 
ExCasht-1 -0.056
a -0.056a -0.034a -0.056a 
 
(-10.59) (-10.59) (-4.77) (-10.62) 
ChgExCash -0.118a -0.118a -0.104a -0.159a 
 
(-14.02) (-17.71) (-16.72) (-8.79) 
R-ADRI  0.001 
  
0.006 
 
(0.21) 
  
(1.02) 
R-ADRI * ChgExCash 0.031b 
  
0.064a 
 
(2.69) 
  
(3.70) 
C-ADRI 
 
0.006 
  
  
(0.99) 
  C-ADRI * ChgExCash 
 
0.100a 
  
  
(6.12) 
  Exprop 
  
0.011b 
 
   
(2.12) 
 Exprop * ChgExCash 
  
0.043a 
 
   
(4.58) 
 RuLaw 
   
0.010c 
    
(1.65) 
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RuLaw * ChgExCash 
   
0.044b 
    
(2.53) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.557 0.559 0.558 0.558 
N 38,578 38,578 38,578 38,578 
 
agency costs explanation and the financing constraint explanation for my findings, I investigate 
the extent to which the dissipation of excess cash impacts firms’ profitability taking the investor 
protection environment   and   capital   market   developments  into  consideration.  The decision 
to deploy internal funds is of primary importance to firm performance. If the higher levels of 
investments documented in the previous section represent misallocation of resources and hence, 
are harmful to equity holders, I should be able to detect how the choice of spending excess cash 
impinges on firm performance. 
To gauge how the investment behavior in the presence of excess cash affects firm 
performance, I regress firms’ operating performance on excess cash at the beginning of the year, 
the dissipation of excess cash (ExCasht-ExCasht-1), shareholder rights metrics, and the interaction 
of dissipation of excess cash with shareholder rights variables. I use industry-adjusted operating 
performance to control for industry effects, measured as earnings before depreciation and 
interests scaled by total assets (ROA) less the global industry’s median value for that year. I 
control for firm size, asset structure and sales growth at the firm level. I also include the three 
capital market development variables, lagged industry-adjusted operating performance to 
account for the persistence of performance, as well as year dummies to control for the effect of 
the business cycle. To alleviate the concern of within-country dependence, I estimate all the 
regression specifications with country random effects. Given that my main objective is to test 
whether the dissipation of excessive cash holdings affects firms’ performance, I estimate the 
regression analysis for the subsample of firms with positive excess cash.  
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The results for the link between external governance, the dissipation of excess cash and 
firms’ profitability are reported in Table 2.5. Across all four models, the lagged industry-adjusted 
operating performance has significant explanatory power for current firm performance, 
indicating persistence in operating performance. The coefficients on governance metrics are 
insignificant in two of the four models (except for the expropriation risk index) at 5% level. The 
results are generally consistent with Dittmar et al. (2007) and Mikkleson and Partch (2003) in 
that governance is unrelated to firms’ profitability. Also, the coefficients on the one-year lagged 
excess cash for all four models are significantly negative, suggesting a negative association 
between holding excess cash and firms’ future profitability across legal regimes.  
In Model 1, the significant coefficient on the dissipation of excess cash (ChgExCash = 
ExCasht-1 - ExCasht) of -0.118 (t=-14.02) points to a negative association between the dissipation 
of excess cash and firms’ future profitability. However, the coefficient on the interaction term of 
dissipation of excess cash with R-ADRI dummy (high shareholder rights take a value of 1) is 
negative and significant (0.031, t=2.69), offsetting about one-third of the negative effect of 
dissipation of excess cash on firms’ profitability. An F-test indicates that the sum of coefficients 
on dissipation of excess cash and the interaction term is still negative and significant, indicating 
that the dissipation of excess cash has negative repercussions even for firms established in 
countries with strong shareholder rights. The results in the remaining models are similar to those 
in Model 1. For example, the coefficient on dissipation of excess cash is 0.118 (t=17.71) and the 
sum of coefficients on dissipation and interaction term (0.018, p-value=0.62) is insignificant 
when the external governance is proxied by C-ADRI while the corresponding numbers are 0.104 
(t=16.72%) and 0.061(p-value=0.00) when we use expropriation risk index as proxy for 
governance. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard deviation dissipation of excess 
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cash is associated with up to a 1.46% reduction of firms’ operating performance relative to its 
industry in weak governance regime while the corresponding number is 0.75% when the legal 
structure is strong. Given that the mean return on assets in our sample firms is 7.36%, these 
reductions are equivalent to 10% to 20% change in the profitability.  
In Model 4, which includes the rule of law index, R-ADRI, and the interaction of these two 
variables with dissipation of excess cash, the coefficient on dissipation of excess cash remains 
significantly negative (-0.159, t=8.79), and the estimates on both interaction terms are positive 
and significant. This implies that both shareholder rights and the enforcement of these rights 
constitute independent forces in the impact of excess cash on firms’ profitability. In all cases 
except for C-ADRI, the positive and significant coefficients on the interaction terms of excess 
cash with the governance metric variable do not completely offset the adverse impact of excess 
cash on firms’ performance. The overall evidence points to an adverse effect of the use of excess 
cash on firms’ profitability, and that weak shareholder rights magnify this effect. This evidence 
corroborates the finding of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) in the US, but is consistent with the 
results documented by Mikkelson and Partch (2003) and Harford et al. (2008).    
2.6.2. Robustness checks 
To validate my findings, I conduct a battery of robustness checks and present the results in 
Table 2.6. In Model 1, I use the total sample, instead of the subsample of firms with positive 
excess cash, and re-estimate the regression with R-ADRI as the governance metric. The 
coefficients on both lagged excess cash and dissipation of excess cash are still negative and 
significant, but have a smaller magnitude. Moreover, the high quality of shareholder rights can 
cancel out half of the negative effect of dissipation of excess cash on firms’ profitability. In 
Models 2 and 3, I use two alternative measures of excess cash, estimated using random effects 
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and Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach for pooled data. The inferences are similar to those obtained 
from Model 1 in Table 2.5. The results are unaltered in Model 4, where I use raw operating 
performance rather than the industry-adjusted metric.  
In Models 5 and 6 I test the impact of holding excess cash on firms’ profitability.  
Specifically in model 5 I regress industry-adjusted operating performance on lagged excess cash, 
revised anti-director rights, the interaction term of lagged excess cash with governance metric, 
and other same control variables as the models in Table 2.5. The significantly negative 
coefficient on lagged excess cash of -0.113 (t=-15.13) signifies a adverse impact of holding 
excess cash on firm’s performance and translates into a reduction of 1.43% in operating 
performance (ROA) relative to its industry in countries with poor shareholder rights.  In Model 6 
I test whether the excess cash holdings have lingering effect by re-estimating Model 5 in Table 
2.6 using operating performance at year t+1 (ROAt+1) as the dependent variable. The significant 
coefficient on excess cash, -0.047, indicates that the impact of positive excess cash on 
performance lasts at least for two years in countries with poor investor protections. The positive 
and significant coefficient on the interaction term of excess cash with the shareholder 
governance metric in both models suggests that the effect is partly, but not completely, cancelled 
out in countries with strong shareholder rights.      
In sum, there is persuasive evidence that the use of excess cash by firms operating in systems 
typified by weak shareholder protection leads to poor corporate performance. In most cases, high 
quality of shareholder rights partly alleviates the negative effect of excess cash on profitability, 
leaving a smaller, but still significant, reduction in operating performance. The findings lead us 
to conclude that the spending of excess cash on investments impedes firms’ performance, giving 
rise to legitimate concerns of outside shareholders about the large cash build-up. The results also 
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Table 2.6 Robustness checks: Investor protection, dissipation of excess cash 
 and operating performance 
 
This table reports the results of a series of robustness checks on the relation between excess cash, operating 
performance and the quality of investor protection. The dependent variable for Models 1-3 and Model 5 is 
industry-adjusted operating performance at year t estimated as earnings before interests and depreciation scaled 
by total assets minus global industry value (median of country medians each year). The dependent variable for 
Model 4 is raw operating performance and for Model 6 it is industry-adjusted ROA at year t+1. Firm and 
country level control variables are as described in Tables 5 and 1. I classify sample countries based on the 
median value of R-ADRI, where the governance dummy equals 1 if a country’s value is above the median 
value. In Models 1, 4, 5 and 6, the measure of excess cash is obtained through averaging the coefficients from 
regressions for each country (ExCash(Avg)). In Model 2, the measure of excess cash is obtained from the 
random effect regression for the pooled data (ExCash(Ran)) while in Model 3, excess cash is obtained through 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression for the pooled data for all countries (ExCash(F-M)). The dissipation of 
excess cash (ChgExCash) is measured as excess cash at year t-1 minus excess cash at year t. All models 
include year fixed effects and are estimated using country random effect. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
a, b, c denote statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
              
 
Total  ExCash ExCash Raw Holding ExCash 
 
Sample (Ran) (F-M) ROAt InROAt InROAt+1 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.049
a -0.046a -0.046a -0.037a -0.050a -0.033a 
 
(-13.21) (-9.03) (-8.55) (-5.49) (-7.46) (-5.29) 
Industry Adj. ROAt-1 0.794
a 0.805a 0.807a 0.770a 0.771a 0.748a 
 
(364.71) (256.91) (246.86) (214.85) (213.62) (198.95) 
LSIZE 0.004
a 0.004a 0.004a 0.005a 0.005a 0.002a 
 
(22.78) (15.89) (14.89) (14.82) (14.32) (6.57) 
PPE / Assets 0.017
a 0.015a 0.014a 0.012a 0.001 0.031a 
 
(11.61) (6.40) (5.56) (3.70) (0.44) (9.31) 
Sales Growth 0.055
a 0.061a 0.061a 0.066a 0.064a 0.001 
 
(63.08) (51.34) (49.26) (44.85) (43.53) (0.59) 
CrdSize -0.062
a -0.048b -0.042c -0.025 -0.021 -0.010 
 
(-3.90) (-2.09) (-1.75) (-0.85) (-0.71) (-0.39) 
BonSize -0.013
a -0.010c -0.011c -0.015b -0.016b -0.024a 
 
(-3.14) (-1.69) (-1.77) (-2.10) (-2.10) (-3.93) 
MktSize -0.017 -0.025
c -0.020 -0.030c -0.024 -0.014 
 
(-1.57) (-1.86) (-1.41) (-1.73) (-1.43) (-0.96) 
ExCasht-1 -0.010
a -0.043a -0.045a -0.057a -0.113a -0.047a 
 
(-4.02) (-10.09) (-9.87) (-10.76) (-15.13) (-6.14) 
ChgExCash -0.061
a -0.195a -0.187a -0.117a 
  
 
(-11.33) (-25.71) (-23.61) (-13.87) 
  R-ADRI  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(0.59) (0.46) (0.31) (0.28) (-0.73) (-0.83) 
R-ADRI * ChgExCash 0.025
a 0.080a 0.078a 0.029b 
  
 
(3.29) (7.87) (7.31) (2.52) 
  R-ADRI * ExCasht-1 
    
0.056a 0.031a 
     
(5.80) (3.21) 
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Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.538 0.566 0.566 0.563 0.557 0.567 
N 91,659 52,711 48,483 38,662 39,207 31,440 
 
imply that the greater sensitivity of corporate investments to excess cash in firms operating in 
countries with weaker institutions is due to agency conflicts, rather than shallow capital markets.  
The strong negative link between the use of excess cash and firms’ profitability in countries 
where shareholders are not well protected indicates that the depletion of excess cash in such 
countries signifies inefficient investments. The combination of evidence documented in this 
study supports empire-building hypothesis that cash stockpiles can be misallocated by managers. 
The findings also suggest that the agency conflict of cash holdings manifest primarily through 
the use of cash, rather than the hoarding of cash, as previously documented by Dittmar et al. 
(2003). 
2.7. Conclusion 
Using cross-sectional and time series data and taking advantage of sizable variation in the 
quality of external governance mechanisms across countries, I document the first empirical 
evidence in the international setting that firms overinvest when holding excessive cash reserves 
and the proclivity of overinvestment is magnified when investors are not well protected. The 
greater overinvestment inclinations drive down the cash level, which makes firms operating in 
weaker governance structures—exemplified by shareholder rights and the enforcement of these 
rights—do not hold higher levels of cash, contrasting with the previous evidence that firms 
invest more in liquid assets when shareholder rights are poorer. I then show empirically that the 
inefficient use of cash dampens firms’ operating performance. Thus my analysis highlights that 
weak country-level governance considerably impacts the use of liquid assets and the investment 
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behavior of the firm, which in turn affects the firm’s performance in economically important 
magnitudes.   
The findings of the influence of external corporate governance mechanisms on 
overinvestment behavior have important implications in the international context. Previous 
literature on international corporate governance asserts that agency problems manifest 
principally through non-value-maximizing investment choices in wealthy common law 
countries; in contrast, it has been argued that in countries with weak governance constraints, the 
agency conflict lies in extracting private benefits of control through asset diversions (Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)). My analysis provides empirical 
evidence consistent with Albuquerue and Wang’s (2008) model which predicts that firms 
governed by weaker governance structure have stronger incentives to overinvest in order to 
extract more private beneifts in the future.   
 My findings bring the relation between managerial entrenchment and cash policy in the 
international context in line with that of the US evidence. However, the driving forces seem to 
differ. While the evidence in Harford et al. (2008) that US firms with entrenched managers hold 
less cash is attributed to managers dissipating cash quickly to avoid being targeted by outside 
shareholders, my evidence indicates that firms hold less cash because controlling shareholders 
value empire-building and they can do so with little fear when the external governance is weak. 
My finding that large cash reserves are problematic, combined with the evidence by La Porta et 
al. (2000a) that firms pay lower dividends when shareholder rights are not well defined, suggest 
that the true entrenchment is that of controlling shareholders retaining a larger portion of 
earnings and misallocating the funds.  
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 41 COUNTRIES 
 
This appendix provides summary statistics for a sample of 115,945 firm-year observations from 41 
countries over 1996-2008 period. Sample obtained from Worldscope database excludes financials and 
utilities. All firm-level numbers are averages of annual median values. Cash ratio is cash and marketable 
securities scaled by total assets. CFVOL is estimated as the median of industry cash flow volatility over the 
past ten years. Size is the book value of assets in 2008 US dollars (millions). Market-to-Book ratio (MTB) 
is estimated as (book value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity) scaled by total 
assets. Leverage is computed as long term debt plus short term debt divided by total assets. Cash flow is 
earnings after interest, taxes and common dividends but before depreciation scaled by total assets. Net 
working capital (NWC) is calculated as current assets less current liabilities less cash and marketable 
securities to total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. R-ADRI represents revised 
anti-director index from Djankov et al. (2008). C-ADRI is corrected anti-director index from Spamann 
(2009). Expropriation risk index (Exprop) and rule of law index (RuLaw) are from La Porta et al. (1998). 
CrdSize represents credit provided by banking sector. BonSize is bond market capitalization whereas 
MktSize is stock market capitalization. All these three variables are scaled by domestic gross product 
(GDP) and the statistics reported are mean of annual values.   
                  
  No. of Cash   Firm     Cash     
Country Firms Ratio CFVOL Size MTB Leverage Flow NWC CAPEX 
Argentina 426 0.048 0.051 1349 1.06 0.249 0.067 -0.007 0.06 
Australia 6,951 0.079 0.096 113 1.417 0.164 0.044 -0.001 0.043 
Austria 591 0.084 0.028 351 1.175 0.245 0.078 0.035 0.058 
Belgium 1,081 0.077 0.04 284 1.247 0.252 0.078 0.009 0.058 
Brazil 1,677 0.099 0.047 555 1.038 0.268 0.057 -0.014 0.055 
Canada 6,465 0.048 0.061 156 1.36 0.199 0.062 0.018 0.06 
Chile 1,020 0.038 0.029 373 1.06 0.225 0.059 0.059 0.05 
Columbia 130 0.054 0.028 1390 0.928 0.085 0.055 0.025 0.031 
Denmark 1,314 0.071 0.042 160 1.269 0.261 0.078 0.063 0.051 
Egypt 67 0.098 0.024 1273 1.456 0.361 0.085 -0.08 0.067 
Finland 1,367 0.079 0.04 208 1.323 0.235 0.076 0.065 0.056 
France 6,011 0.098 0.035 178 1.262 0.209 0.069 0.036 0.039 
Germany 5,975 0.079 0.048 223 1.234 0.18 0.067 0.086 0.045 
Greece 1,080 0.054 0.036 304 1.415 0.263 0.061 0.077 0.05 
HongKong 6,108 0.154 0.061 133 1.031 0.157 0.04 0.007 0.031 
India 3,856 0.031 0.032 118 1.095 0.316 0.071 0.092 0.055 
Indonesia 1,664 0.096 0.065 372 1.068 0.36 0.058 0.008 0.046 
Ireland 561 0.104 0.034 351 1.391 0.247 0.066 0.002 0.039 
Israel 745 0.123 0.038 364 1.248 0.253 0.046 0.014 0.038 
Italy 1,989 0.088 0.031 410 1.215 0.243 0.057 0.046 0.034 
Japan 21,602 0.128 0.019 423 1.046 0.242 0.041 -0.007 0.029 
Jordan 61 0.143 0.039 226 1.414 0.147 0.071 0.062 0.068 
Korea 3,830 0.085 0.029 618 0.905 0.349 0.051 -0.047 0.044 
Malaysia 6,857 0.071 0.037 113 1.074 0.223 0.049 0.044 0.034 
Mexico 1,015 0.052 0.042 1075 1.14 0.239 0.073 0.029 0.041 
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Netherland 1,612 0.053 0.033 490 1.377 0.225 0.085 0.064 0.048 
NewZealand 791 0.025 0.036 91 1.329 0.243 0.057 0.043 0.05 
Norway 1,581 0.11 0.053 202 1.3 0.282 0.063 -0.011 0.061 
Pakistan 267 0.065 0.041 174 1.256 0.268 0.067 -0.024 0.057 
Peru 225 0.05 0.064 355 1.109 0.25 0.085 0.018 0.055 
Philippine 782 0.063 0.048 220 0.959 0.258 0.05 -0.018 0.046 
Portugal 502 0.037 0.031 523 1.102 0.332 0.062 -0.021 0.041 
Singapore 4,780 0.127 0.041 113 1.107 0.184 0.053 0.026 0.038 
SouthAfrica 2,797 0.094 0.048 382 1.316 0.126 0.092 0.032 0.053 
Spain 1,077 0.058 0.026 810 1.312 0.232 0.072 0.003 0.043 
Sweden 2,686 0.098 0.067 79 1.491 0.163 0.066 0.065 0.037 
Switzerland 1,994 0.115 0.03 225 1.277 0.209 0.078 0.079 0.04 
Thailand 2,534 0.056 0.05 115 1.012 0.321 0.066 -0.004 0.039 
Turkey 826 0.07 0.069 618 1.393 0.183 0.094 0.082 0.062 
UK 10,915 0.088 0.056 96 1.443 0.142 0.054 -0.002 0.037 
Venezuela 133 0.055 0.045 305 0.719 0.121 0.06 0.039 0.032 
 
                
  R- C- Exprop         
Country ADRI ADRI Risk RuLaw CrdSize BonSize MktSize 
Argentina 2 3 5.91 5.35 0.368 0.064 0.379 
Australia 4 4 9.27 10 1.007 0.478 1.069 
Austria 2.5 4 9.69 10 1.263 0.404 0.26 
Belgium 3 2 9.63 10 1.198 0.404 0.688 
Brazil 5 5 7.62 6.32 0.763 0.123 0.429 
Canada 4 4 9.67 10 1.639 0.294 1.058 
Chile 4 5 7.5 7.02 0.839 0.19 0.96 
Columbia 3 4 6.95 2.08 0.417 0.004 0.221 
Denmark 4 4 9.67 10 1.381 1.213 0.599 
Egypt 3 2 6.3 4.17 1 0 0.537 
Finland 3.5 4 9.67 10 0.675 0.242 1.255 
France 3.5 5 9.65 8.98 1.083 0.405 0.781 
Germany 3.5 4 9.9 9.23 1.373 0.463 0.478 
Greece 2 3 7.12 6.18 0.937 0.035 0.624 
HongKong 5 4 8.29 8.22 1.412 0.168 3.416 
India 5 4 7.75 4.17 0.562 0.012 0.523 
Indonesia 4 2 7.16 3.98 0.513 0.018 0.273 
Ireland 5 4 9.67 7.8 1.29 0.167 0.6 
Israel 4 3 8.25 4.82 0.785 0 0.672 
Italy 2 2 9.35 8.33 1.032 0.429 0.441 
Japan 4.5 5 9.67 8.98 3.001 0.444 0.766 
Jordan 1 3 6.07 4.35 0.942 0 1.334 
Korea 4.5 4 8.31 5.35 0.921 0.537 0.554 
95 
 
   
Malaysia 5 4 7.95 6.78 1.69 0.401 1.493 
Mexico 3 2 7.29 5.35 0.358 0.109 0.268 
Netherland 2.5 4 9.98 10 1.592 0.541 1.121 
NewZealand 4 5 9.69 10 1.202 0 0.401 
Norway 3.5 4 9.88 10 0.833 0.234 0.482 
Pakistan 4 5 5.62 3.03 0.412 0 0.292 
Peru 4.5 4 5.54 2.5 0.204 0.036 0.361 
Philippine 4 4 5.22 2.73 0.632 0.006 0.502 
Portugal 2.5 3 8.9 8.68 1.355 0.277 0.419 
Singapore 5 4 9.3 8.57 0.847 0.176 1.781 
SouthAfrica 5 5 6.88 4.42 1.654 0.125 1.877 
Spain 5 5 9.52 7.8 1.377 0.333 0.774 
Sweden 3.5 4 9.4 10 1.099 0.449 1.082 
Switzerland 3 3 9.98 10 1.763 0.372 2.393 
Thailand 4 4 7.42 6.25 1.382 0.132 0.503 
Turkey 3 4 7 5.18 0.432 0 0.264 
UK 5 4 9.71 8.57 1.482 0.171 1.417 
Venezuela 1 2 6.89 6.37 0.165 0.007 0.074 
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APPENDIX B: MEASURING EXCESS CASH 
Following previous studies, I define excess cash as the cash beyond the normal level of cash 
held for genuine motives to meet operations and investment needs. I use various specifications of 
the following regression model to estimate the normal cash. 
Cash ratioit = β0 + β1 CFVOLit + β2 LSIZEit + β3 MTBit + β4 Leverageit + β5 Cash Flowit 
           + β6NWCit + β7CAPEXit + β8RDit + β9DIVit + β10CrdSize + β11BonSize  
        + β12MktSize + β13R-ADRI + Year Dummies + Firm Fixed Effects + εit         (1.B)                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 Firm-level variables are intended to capture the transaction costs and precautionary motive of 
cash holdings. I include year dummies to account for the fact that cash holdings are affected by 
macroeconomic conditions and the business cycle. I apply firm fixed effect since some firms 
may hold high level of cash for idiosyncratic reason. Because corporate cash policy is affected 
by institutional differences, I include three capital market development variables and R-ADRI as 
predictors of cash level to avoid possible model misspecification.     
 I use three different specifications and estimation techniques to obtain the predicted normal 
cash. First, given that firms from different countries may hold cash for different reasons, I 
estimate equation above (without country-level variables) separately for each country and then 
take the average of coefficient of each variable. I apply the coefficients to corresponding 
variables to obtain the predicted normal cash and define excess cash as the difference between 
actual cash and predicted normal cash. Following previous research, I do not subtract the 
estimated firm specific effects when computing excess cash as firm fixed effects do not capture 
the transaction cost and precautionary motives of cash holdings.  Second, I employ Fama-
Macbeth (1973) approach to estimate a pooled regression of Equation (1.B) (without year 
dummies and firm-fixed effects) by estimating the model each year and then take the average of 
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the parameter estimates from annual regressions. Third, I estimate a pooled random effects 
regression of Equation (1.B) (without firm fixed effects). As argued by Fresard and Salva (2009), 
the effect of institutional structures on firms’ cash level is not justified for genuinely operational 
and investment reasons. Therefore, I do not deduct their estimated effects when computing 
excess cash.  
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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS 
by 
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Advisor: Dr. Mai Iskandar-Datta 
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
This dissertation is composed of two distinct chapters. The first chapter is concerned with the 
secular trends in corporate cash holdings and the determinants of the changing cash policies for 
seven industrialized countries—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the US, and UK. In 
the first chapter, I document that a pronounced secular upward trend in cash holdings is almost 
systemic across sample countries over 1991-2008, with France exhibiting a modest rise and 
Japan a substantial decline. However, the driving forces underlying the cash pattern are not 
uniform across countries. While the evolution in firm characteristics necessitated elevated cash 
balances, the time-varying firm attributes explain the cash pattern only in Canada, France, UK 
and the US. The agency motive plays a role in the rise in cash balances in Germany, consistent 
with the perspective that agency problems of cash holdings primarily manifest in countries with 
weak external governance. My analysis highlights that the functioning of the financial system is 
crucial to corporate cash policy as Australia’s cash pattern is driven by shallow private credit 
markets that curbed cash reserves during the earlier period of my study and the decelerating cash 
trend in Japan is ascribed to financial reforms that eliminated rent-extraction opportunities by 
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banks. While I document some commonality in the determinants of cash policies, some 
determinants are employed differently by the various countries indicating divergence in cash 
practices.  
The second chapter focuses on the deployment of cash and the resulting effects on firms’ 
operating performance in an international context. Using a large sample from 41 countries, I 
provide new and compelling evidence that firms under weak external governance structures hold 
less cash than firms operating under strong governance regimes, contrary to previous literature. 
Consistent with managerial empire building prediction, my study reveals that firms deplete their 
excess cash by overinvesting and this effect is exacerbated in countries with weak governance. 
My result of greater sensitivity of investments to excess cash support agency costs rather than 
financing constraint explanation. The depletion of excess cash has an adverse impact on firm 
performance, especially in countries with weak investor protection. These findings are 
significant because they imply that the agency conflict of cash holdings primarily lies in the 
misallocation of capital, not in its accumulation.   
Key words: Corporate finance, corporate liquidity, agency problem, Investor protection, 
corporate cash policy, firm performance, corporate investments  
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